Did Israel's army target civilians?

The Israeli Army’s advocate general, Maj. Gen. Avichai Mandelblitt is quoted by the New York Times as saying that the Goldstone report accusing the Army of aiming at civilian targets in Gaza is “a vicious lie.”

Yael Stein, research director of the human rights organization, B’Tselem also told the Times that she does not “accept Goldstone’s conclusion of a systematic attack on civilian infrastructure.”

But the Army cannot check itself, Ms. Stein continued. An independent inquiry is necessary. “The Army needs to explain why so many civilians were killed,” Ms. Stein concluded.

B’Tselem’s research shows that the Israel Army over the years consistently believed in the efficacy of collective punishment and is practicing it today in the Gaza Strip. No resident is allowed out and nothing is allowed in except for a minimum of food and medicine called humanitarian aid. A million and a half residents are being cruelly punished for the actions of the Hamas terrorists.

An independent inquiry into the Army’s actions a year ago is exactly what Goldstone recommended. He said in an interview that his conclusions would not stand up in court because he did not present the views of the Israel Army, which had boycotted his investigation.

World opinion forced the Army to change its mind. It has prepared a detailed brief on the difficulty of fighting armed militants interspersed among the civilian population.

This is a legitimate argument. Take the case of Dr. Abulaish, the Gaza surgeon who serves in Israeli hospitals, lost three of his daughters to a shell that penetrated his parlor. But there were snipers on his roof, he has said in speeches in this country.

But there were no snipers on the roof of the flour mill which supplied the daily bread of thousands of Gazans. There were no soldiers at the destroyed water works, which released thousands of tons of raw sewage. There were no armed militants in the schools, hospitals and other civilian institutions which were systematically wasted, including the only cement plant.

Previous operations of the Israel Army were not part of Goldstone’s investigation. Let me recall what happened in 2006.

On June 25, 2006, Cpl. Gilad Shalit was abducted and held in Gaza for ransom. The release of about a thousand terrorists, jailed in Israel, was demanded for his return. Almost four years later negotiations are ongoing through German and Egyptian mediators.

It took the Israel Army just three days to find a suitable target for its retaliation for the kidnapping. It had to be a significant civilian institution, such as a power plant, for collective punishment. This had nothing to do with negotiations for the soldier’s release.

“Act of vengeance” is the title of B’Tselem’s report. Here is a quote:

“The decision was to attack the only electricity power plant in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli air force bombed the plant in the early morning hours of 28 June. The target of the attack was clear: six missiles were fired at the plant’s six transformers. Two missed, and within minutes, two more missiles destroyed the remaining transformers. The oil within the transformers continued to burn for about one month.”

And so the one and a half million Moslems, who are crowded into the Gaza Strip and who are ruled by the Hamas terrorists, were deprived of 45 percent of their supply of electricity. The remaining 55 percent comes from the Israel Electric Company.

Gaza went on a cycle of 6 to 8 hours of electricity followed by 6 to 8 hours of blackout, The deleterious effect of the blackouts on the health and well-being of the people of Gaza, and particularly those on dialysis, are delineated in the Btselem report.

The destroyed transformers had been custom built in the United States and it would have taken at least eight months to build and install new ones. A faster option was to install less powerful Egyptian transformers. This was done.

The destruction of the Gaza electric transformers was collective punishment of the entire Gaza population whose rulers had dared to kidnap an Israeli soldier. It was also a war crime. The International Humanitarian Act forbids any attack on a civilian institution. But no one, except B’Tselem, noticed it in 2006. All eyes were on the fate of the kidnapped soldier.

Judge Goldstone could not help but notice the systematic destruction of scores of civilian installations. He voices his suspicion and asks for two independent inquiries: one on the attacks on Arab civilians in Gaza and the second on the rocketing of Jewish civilians in Sderot.

The government of Israel, which had boycotted Goldstone’s inquiry, was forced to take notice. Hence a two page report in the Times a week ago on Sunday. The Goldstone report will not go away. It is anything but a vicious lie.

Obama's weakness to hinder peace effort?

There is legitimate concern (voiced, for example, by J Street head, Jeremy Ben-Ami) that a failure of the Obama administration to deliver on health care, not to mention other aspects of its domestic agenda, is going to hinder or prevent progress on peace between Israel and the Arab world. The notion is that a weakened Obama presidency will lack the credibility or energy to intervene robustly in moving the parties forward in the Middle East.

This may be true, but it should also be remembered that Presidents Carter, Clinton and Bush 43 all made efforts toward peacemaking after their administrations started treading water. Carter even achieved a lasting measure of success (with the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty). Both Clinton and Bush 43 may be criticized for efforts that were too little, too late (a more valid criticism regarding Bush than Clinton), but both made high profile efforts---Clinton at Camp David II and Bush at Annapolis.

It is probably premature to think that the Obama presidency is going down in flames after a mere year in office. But it's interesting that both Israel and the United States are suffering from deadlock as a result of their political systems.

In the case of the US, it's the two houses of Congress, with the more democratic (both small d and, for now, upper-case Democratic) House of Representatives passing bills (e.g., on health care) which are blocked or eviscerated by the more patrician and less popularly elected Senate--- where Alaska has the same two votes as populous California. And now, the need for a 51 vote majority in the Senate has been replaced by an almost impossible, filibuster-proof, 60 votes. Clearly, there's a need for structural change here.

This is parallel with the structural problem in Israeli politics, where the country suffers from a dysfunctional electoral system -- an extreme form of proportional representation that requires unstable multi-party governing coalitions and has reduced the two major parties, together, to fewer than half the votes in the most recent elections. A number of fixes have been suggested, including the possibility of electing at least some members to the Knesset on a geographic constituency basis rather than from a national party list. My favorite is the simplest: raising the threshold of votes needed for a party to get into the Knesset from the current two percent to four or five percent---eliminating most of the small interest group parties at a single blow.

Anat Hoffman: Women of the Wall

If you weren’t able to be a part of Meretz USA’s conference call with Women of the Wall chair, Anat Hoffman, yesterday, you still have a chance to hear a recorded version. Just dial 218-844-0951 and, when prompted, dial the access code: 388791#

The technical quality isn’t perfect, but it’s worth it to hear the perspective of a “warrior” for Jewish pluralism and women’s rights, as Meretz USA past president, Lilly Rivlin, characterized Anat in her introductory remarks.

I have never been overwhelmed spiritually by Jerusalem or the Western Wall, but I can fully identify with what Anat had to say. Here are a few highlights:

• The challenge of Zionism was to create a sovereign State and infuse it with Jewish values. But there is a struggle ongoing in Israel as to what these “Jewish values” are: Are they the values of the Book of Joshua – replete with war and conquest – or are they the values of the Book of Isaiah, with its focus on ethics and justice?

• The fight for rights at the Wall is really a fight for freedom and pluralism in all of Jerusalem. And this fight in Jerusalem is really a fight for the character and soul of Judaism and the Jewish people.

• Too many secular Israelis regard the Women of the Wall issue as a religious one, divorced from their day-to-day reality. American Jews – who helped implant the idea of pluralism in Israel, Anat noted – need to step up and raise their voices to make Israelis take notice and understand what’s at stake.

• Anat encouraged everyone to take part in the Reform movement’s letter-writing campaign. And, to help support the Women financially, she also suggested that people purchase a Women of the Wall tallit and “wear their support”. All net proceeds go to the organization.

To hear the entire conversation with Anat Hoffman, dial 218-844-0951 and, when prompted, dial the access code: 388791#

What's new in Geneva Accord

Thanks to Michal Radoshitzky, director of foreign relations for the Israeli Geneva Initiative organization, which promotes the Geneva Accord of December 2003, the following is featured in the coming Winter 2010 issue of ISRAEL HORIZONS magazine:

... A political vacuum is what catalyzed the creation of the Geneva Accord and Initiative during the darkest days of the Sharon government. It is what led Israelis and Palestinians to embark on Track II [unofficial] diplomacy and surprise the world–and much more so Israelis and Palestinians–with a detailed plan to end the conflict. The Geneva Accord is a joint Israeli-Palestinian model for a permanent-status agreement from 2003, which illustrates that it is possible to end the conflict and to meet the desires of the majorities in both nations. Yet while the Geneva Initiative did succeed in demonstrating that there is a partner for peace on the other side and that peace is indeed possible ... the text is filled with references to what has been described by many to be a mysterious "Annex X." ...

Over the last two years, the Accord annexes have been drafted and incorporated into a 423-page book. The following summarizes each of these annexes:

• Security: Palestine will be a non-militarized state but with strong internal security forces. The annex details, among other things: what tasks will be assigned to the Palestinian security forces, the stages of withdrawal of the Israeli security forces, and the nature and order of the Israeli forces that will temporarily remain at the international border crossings. So too does the annex list which weapons will be prohibited (essentially offensive military weaponry) within the borders of Palestine.
  

• Gaza-West Bank Corridor: A corridor will be built between Gaza and the West Bank which will be under Israeli sovereignty but under full Palestinian control. The main characteristics of the corridor is that it will be lower than ground level and will be wide enough to allow passage of vehicles and a train. The annex describes, among other things, that entrance and exit to and from the corridor will be from its two ends in Gaza and the West Bank only, and that the Palestinian security forces will be the authority responsible for law enforcement within the corridor. In addition, the annex details the means of security that will be installed throughout and inside this corridor.

• Implementation and Verification Group (IVG): International forces will aid the two sides in implementing the agreement, in mediating between them and in protecting the non-militarized Palestinian state from external threats. This annex details the composition of this force including its headquarters, implementation arm, military branch and policing unit.
  

• Multinational Presence at Temple Mount: Another international force which will be placed in the area will be positioned at Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif. This force will be comprised of representatives of the states and organizations which are members of the IVG and of representatives of the states and organizations which are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This force will provide additional back-up to Palestinian security forces at the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif in ensuring that no excavation, building and maintenance work which is inconsistent with the agreement between the two sides takes place. The annex also details the structure of the security branch and observation branch of this force.

• Jerusalem: The Jerusalem annex demonstrates what the border passages between Israel and Palestine would look like under a permanent agreement. The annex details a number of selected models that could be copied to different places and exemplifies the arrangement at the French Hill interchange, where a large terminal will be created to allow passage between Jerusalem and Al-Quds. Likewise, the annex details the arrangement for route 60, which will become a bi-national road, and the pedestrian border crossing between the two sides. According to the Geneva Initiative, the Old City will remain accessible to both sides, but sovereignty over it will be divided between Palestine and Israel. Entering the Old City with weapons will be prohibited. The annex also demonstrates the implementation of passages through the city gates.

• Designated Roads: Israelis will be allowed to travel on three Palestinian roads without the regular border crossing procedures. In order to drive on such a road, Israeli drivers will have to register at an Israeli control station where a surveillance device (similar to a GPS) will be installed in their vehicle. At the end of the journey on this road, each Israeli vehicle will undergo another Israeli inspection to ensure that all passengers who entered the road, exit it. An Israeli vehicle will not be permitted to enter or exit Palestine via a designated road.

  
  

  Designated roads will have an international force presence in order to monitor movement and intervene in cases of interaction between Israelis and Palestinians (in the case of road accidents or car trouble, for example).

• Water: Israel and Palestine will re-divide their shared water. In addition to wells, springs and water sources that will be transferred to Palestinian territory as part of the final-status agreement, there will also be shared water sources which are detailed in the annex and to which the agreement will apply. The amount of water that will be transferred from Israel to Palestine as part of this redistribution will be determined on the basis of an equation that will include the hydrological and climatic conditions at the time that the agreement is signed. This equation will be subject to revision in the case that there are significant changes in its components over the years.

  
  

  In order to allow the proper management of water resources, a shared database will be established, along with a shared water commissionership.

• International Border Crossing: Border crossings, similar in nature to the border crossings between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Egypt, will be created between Israel and Palestine. Two border crossings will be open seven days a week, 24 hours a day. All other border crossings will be open five days a week between 6:00 AM and 8:00 PM.

• Inter-Religious Council: The inter-religious council will operate in Jerusalem and will include 21 members: 10 from Israel, 10 from Palestine and one additional member who will be appointed by UNESCO. The council will operate from Jerusalem and will advise the two sides on matters relating to religion, freedom of worship and holy sites, among other issues.

• Environment: Israel and Palestine will commit to maintaining international standards in a variety of fields relating to the environment so as to ensure the correction of past injustices to the environment, and thus guarantee a better future for all. To this end, the mechanisms, committees and mutual commitments that both sides obligate themselves to are listed in detail. The annex includes detailed measures for the mutual struggle against air and water pollution; there is also a list of protected wildlife and regulations for their treatment, as well as details concerning the recycling of garbage on both sides.

• Economy: This annex provides an economic roadmap and deals with the way in which cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian economies would be possible on matters of transport and electricity. It demonstrates how both economies would develop and benefit from such cooperation. The document was originally written by the Aix group and proposes the existence of a separate economic system for each state with the creation of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation mechanisms to the benefit of both sides.

• Refugees: The solution on the matter of refugees is drawn up in the original agreement (i.e., the 2003 Geneva Accord). The annex on refugees has not yet been completed. There is reference to the work that was done by an independent team which details the mechanisms and procedures necessary for implementing the refugee compensation mechanism.

• Link to the Arab Peace Initiative: The Arab Peace Initiative was adopted by the Arab League in 2002. This initiative offers an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict and normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world, should a Palestinian state be established. Implementing the Geneva Accord, in addition to sealing peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon, will enable the Arab Peace Initiative to take effect.

You can read further about the Geneva Accord, and now its annexes, online at www.geneva-accord.org.

Hanania’s Platform for Pres. of Palestine

Ray Hanania, a Chicago-based Palestinian American, is (among other things): a radio talk show host, a newspaper columnist, a comedian and a former president of the Palestinian American Congress. He is also a peace activist.

He does not really believe that his Y’alla Party platform will propel him to the presidency of a nascent state of Palestine, but he is seriously campaigning for peaceful coexistence and a two-state solution. His party name is slang in both Israel and Palestine for “let’s go.”

When his voice was electronically piped into the unofficial bloggers’ session at the J Street conference last October, Hanania proved himself the most clearly supportive of J Street from among the dozen or so American Jews, Palestinians and radicals on the panel. The emotion in his voice that day, indicated how passionate he is about peace.

His recent op-ed in the Jerusalem Post, a critique of Hamas and of activists and news media he sees as “pro-Hamas,” reveals how moderate he is (I'm probably more open to finding wiggle room for a possible role for Hamas than he is). This posting is a mark of my personal respect for the man, but it should not be taken as a political endorsement by Meretz USA, nor as evidence, necessarily, of agreement with every detail of the following campaign platform:

Here's my campaign platform and I think it's doable because Israelis and Palestinians are already responding positively. This is an overview and details will be forthcoming to help understand the overriding concept. That concept is simple -- instead of working out the details, focus on the bigger picture and define a final peace. Then work backwards and resolves issues. Individual issues are interrelated and it is not possible to resolve the details individually without knowing where we are headed together and how they relate to other details that may or may not be resolved:

• I support two-states, one Israel and one Palestine. As far as I am concerned, I can recognize Israel’s “Jewish” character and Israelis should recognize Palestine’s “non-Jewish” character.
• I oppose violence of any kind from and by anyone. I reject Hamas’ participation in any Palestinian government without first agreeing to surrender all arms and to accept two-states as a “final” peace agreement. But I also reject allowing Israeli settlers to carry any weapons and believe Israelis must impose the same restrictions on them.
• I can support some settlements remaining (in Israeli control) – given the reality of 42 years of time passing -- in a dunum-for-dunum land exchange. If Ariel is 500 dunums with a lifeline from Israel, then Israel gives Palestine 500 dunums in exchange.
• Jerusalem should be a shared city and Palestinians should have an official presence in East Jerusalem. The Old City should be shared by both permitting open access to the city to all with a joint Palestinian-Israeli police presence. (Currently Israel maintains a sharing of the Temple Mount or Haram al-Ash Sharif and that relationship can be worked out better under the direction of two governments in peace.)
• Palestinian refugees would give up their demand to return to pre-1948 homes and lands lost during the conflict with Israel. Instead, some could apply for family reunification through Israel and the remainder would be compensated through a fund created and maintained by the United States, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations.
• I also think Israelis should find it in their hearts to show compassion and offer their apologies to Palestinians for the conflict. (See below a provision for both sides to apologize to each other -- it's not just one-sided.)
• I support creation of a similar fund to compensate those Jews from Arab lands who lost their homes and lands, too, when they fled.
• I think the Wall should be torn down, or relocated to the new borders. I have no problem separating the two nations for a short duration to help rebuild confidence between our two people.
• All political parties, Palestinian and Israelis, should eliminate languages denying each other’s existence, and all maps should be reprinted so that Israeli maps finally show Palestine and Palestinian maps finally show Israel.
• A subway system should be built linking the West Bank portion of the Palestine state to the Gaza Strip portion of the Palestine State. Palestine should be permitted to build a seaport access to strengthen its’ industry, and an airport to permit flights and too and from the Arab and Israeli world.
• I would urge the Arab World to renew their offer to normalize relations with Israel if Israel agrees to support the creation of a Palestinian State. And I would ask both countries to establish embassies in each other’s country to address other problems.
• While non-Jewish Palestinians would continue to live in Israel as citizens, Jews who wish to live in settlements surrendered by Israel could become Palestinian citizens (or possibly retain their Israeli citizenship in terms of voting rights while living under Palestinian laws) and they should be recognized and treated equally.
  
• If Jews want to live in Hebron, they should be allowed to live in Hebron and should be protected, just as non-Jews. In fact, for every Jewish individual seeking to live in Palestine, a Palestinian should be permitted to live in Israel. In fact, major Palestinian populations in Israel could be annexed into Palestine (like settlements).
  
• Another concept is to have non-Jews living in Israel continue to live there but only vote in Palestinian elections, while Jews living in Palestine would only vote in Israeli elections. A special citizenship protection committee could be created to explore how to protect the rights of minorities in each state.
• Israel and Palestine should create joint-governing and security agencies working with the United States to monitor the peace, and establish an agency to pursue criminal acts of violence.
• Both Israel and Palestine apologize to each other and recognize the hardships and pain they each have caused to each other in this conflict. (This was added following publication in the Jerusalem Post and Haaretz.)

Avnery on Lieberman's antics

Uri Avnery, the well-known veteran peace activist and journalist, points out that Avigdor Lieberman was appointed foreign minister because of Israel's dysfunctional governing system, which requires unwieldy multi-party coalition cabinets. To me, Avnery makes less of the concerns that triggered Lieberman's buffoonery than he needs to; still, Lieberman is increasingly an embarrassment and a joke. This column is mainly about the foreign ministry's gross mishandling of relations with Turkey, usually thought of as Israel's friend or ally:

... Turkish television aired a rather primitive series, in which Mossad operatives kidnap Turkish children and hide them in the Israeli embassy. Valiant Turkish agents free the children and kill the evil ambassador.

One can ignore such an obnoxious story altogether or protest mildly. But our illustrious Foreign Minister thought that this was the right occasion to demonstrate to all and sundry that we are no longer abject ghetto Jews who take everything lying down, but proud, upright Jews of a new breed. So the Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, summoned the Turkish ambassador to the Foreign Office in Jerusalem for a carefully staged exhibition of national pride.

When the ambassador arrived, he was surprised to see the place crawling with TV crews and journalists. He was left waiting for a considerable time and then shown into a room where three solemn officials, including Ayalon, were perched on high chairs. He was seated on a low sofa without arms, and had no choice but sit in a reclining position.

Not satisfied with this, Ayalon expressly requested the media people (in Hebrew) to pay attention to the difference in height between the chairs and the sofa, to the absence of the Turkish flag on the table, as well as to the fact that the Israelis did not smile and did not shake hands. ...

Ayalon then delivered (again in Hebrew) a sharp rebuke - all Israeli media used this word rather than the diplomatic term “protest.” Well satisfied with his work, Ayalon saw to it that it got maximum exposure in the media, especially on television. ...

Ayalon got, of course, the unreserved backing of his minister, mentor and party boss, Avigdor Lieberman, who was full of praise.

A few weeks before, Lieberman had assembled all the Israeli ambassadors from around the world, some 150 of them, for a pep talk. He rebuked them for not properly defending the honor of Israel and announced a radical new policy: from now on, the main duty of an Israeli ambassador is to stand up for the dignity of his country, attack anyone who criticizes Israel and leave no insult unanswered, be it big or small. This should take precedence over all other diplomatic duties. ... such as good relations with foreign governments, military and intelligence ties and economic matters.

In less that a year in office, Lieberman has already broken a lot of diplomatic china. He has insulted several friendly governments. In one noteworthy case, he publicly rebuked the Norwegians for celebrating the anniversary of their national writer, Knut Hamsun, who had sympathized with the Nazis. In another case, he attacked the Swedish government for not protesting publicly against an article by a minor scribbler in a Swedish newspaper, in which he made the ridiculous accusation that Israeli soldiers kill Palestinians in order to sell their organs for transplants. Lieberman’s exaggerated reaction turned this into world news.

His tendency to insult foreign governments – a rather original trait for a foreign minister – may have been exacerbated by the refusal of many of his foreign colleagues to meet with him, considering him a racist or an outright fascist - as, indeed, do most Israelis.

When Netanyahu set up his government and appointed Lieberman as his foreign minister, the news was at first met with incredulity. A more absurd appointment could hardly be imagined. But Netanyahu needed him, and could offer him neither the Treasury, which he wanted to lead himself by proxy, nor the defense ministry, which is the private domain of Ehud Barak. The foreign ministry, which few people in Israel take seriously, was the only viable alternative.
Therefore, Netanyahu could not criticize these two Neanderthals, Lieberman and Ayalon, and their antics. But Barak was hopping mad.

As it so happens, Barak is due to visit Turkey tomorrow. The relations between the Israeli and the Turkish defense establishments are as close as can be. Not only is there a certain ideological affinity between the two army commands – both consider themselves as the guardians of national values and look down with contempt on the politicians – but the generals of the two countries are real buddies. Also, the Israeli defense industry depends very much on Turkish orders, about a billion dollars annually.

Lately, some dispute has arisen about drones supplied by Israel, and relations have deteriorated. Barak’s visit is therefore considered very important. Some Israeli commentators believe that the whole Ayalon affair was a not so subtle ploy by Lieberman to sabotage his cabinet rival.
Be that as is may, the whole Israeli establishment realized that Ayalon’s stupid charade has done great damage. He was obliged to retract, and did so in a graceless, half-hearted manner, without first finding out whether this would satisfy the Turks. It did not – and the Turks, becoming more and more furious, demanded a clear and abject apology. This demand was presented as an ultimatum – until midnight on Wednesday, or else. "Else" meant the recall of the ambassador and the downgrading of relations.

Netanyahu caved in. Ayalon apologized again, this time unequivocally, and the Turks graciously accepted. Barak will be going to Turkey. ...

This entire column can be read online at Gush Shalom's website.

Israel & US Jews help Haiti

Haaretz reports the following:

The Israeli Foreign Ministry has prepared a 220-member rescue team for departure to the disaster-stricken country, including an elite army corps [of] engineers and a field hospital to assist the casualties.

The military has leased two Boeing 747s of the El Al airline company to transport the team and equipment.

Seven Israelis thought missing were located late Wednesday and early Thursday. One Israeli, the daughter of late peace activist Abie Nathan, was still unaccounted for. ...Read entire Haaretz article online.

Lilly Rivlin endorses Letty Cottin Pogrebin's suggestion (see below):

Regardless of how worthy other relief organizations may be, I hope you'll consider donating through American Jewish World Service. Here's a link to their website where you'll find a box that makes it easy to send money, which is what I've just done.

Click American Jewish World Service or cut and paste http://ajws.org/. I'm especially proud whenever relief funds go to a non-Jewish cause in the name of the American Jewish community.

Prof. Ahuvia on ‘Peace vs. Justice’

Aaron Ahuvia, Ph.D., is a professor of marketing at the University of Michigan-Dearborn College of Business. He has been active with Brit Tzedek v'Shalom as a member of its national board and executive committee. The following is his article (“No ‘Ongoing Justice,’ No Peace”) in the forthcoming winter 2010 issue of Meretz USA’s ISRAEL HORIZONS magazine:

I read with interest and general agreement Michael Lame's recent article, “Peace vs. Justice” (IH, Autumn 2009). Lame argues for Palestinians to think in terms of partial rather than complete justice. I agree; no one is going to get complete justice either with or without a peace agreement. To advance this discussion, I would like to put forward another way of framing this issue.

Diane Balser, a former executive director of Brit Tzedek v' Shalom, once suggested to me that the Palestinians may get a "just agreement" but will surely not get "historical justice" as "no one gets that." I thought this was very insightful, and with some further thinking, I developed a trichotomy of “just” agreements:

Historical Justice: An agreement achieves historical justice when it makes up for past wrongs to the greatest extent possible. By possible, I mean practically possible rather than politically possible. For example, there is no way to fully make up for a person's death, and compensation cannot be granted which exceeds the wealth of the party making restitution. These are practical limitations on historical justice. But historical justice is not limited by what the party committing the injustice is politically willing to accept.

Procedural Justice: An agreement achieves procedural justice when it is reached through a legitimate and fair process. I would suggest that any agreement reached by the legitimate representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian people would at least partially satisfy the requirement of procedural justice. However, I also believe that for an agreement to be reached the international community will have to exert significant pressure on both sides to make compromises. At a certain point, this pressure can be so intense as to render an agreement to be "under duress," hence not fully consistent with procedural justice. In the same way that complete historical justice is unattainable, so to complete procedural justice may be unattainable given the realities of what would have to happen to create a peace agreement.

Ongoing Justice: This refers to justice as the absence of new injustice. Ongoing justice describes the situation in which once the agreement is implemented, further injustices will not be committed by one side against the other. The concept of "further" injustice is crucial to this definition. Regaining land lost in a previous conflict constitutes historical justice not ongoing justice. However, some Israeli plans which would create a "Palestinian state" and in which Israel controls who may enter at the borders would require Palestinians to live under the continued domination of Israel and would fail the test of ongoing justice.

Like everything else related to this conflict, what would constitute an ongoing injustice would of course be up for debate. In particular, the issue of a demilitarized Palestinian state is a likely to be a source of contention. Israel will not agree to any treaty which did not require Palestine to be demilitarized (i.e., a well-armed police force would be allowed, but not a military with heavy combat weapons). I would argue that a demilitarized Palestine is not an ongoing injustice because although it meets the criteria for 'ongoing,' it fails to qualify as an injustice.

Arms control agreements are not an inherent violation of national sovereignty. It's always odd for me to hear leftists who support US arms control agreements suddenly sound like the John Birch Society by insisting that any limitations on a Palestinian military would nullify its existence as a state. Japan's demilitarized status, particularly back when it really meant something, was a boon to Japan’s economy and didn’t negate their status as a nation state. Palestine could not in the foreseeable future create an army that would be a practical deterrent to an Israeli invasion. But Palestine certainly could spend enough on a military to hinder its economic and social development. So it is likely that a demilitarized Palestine would be in both Israel’s and Palestine’s interest.

Conceptually the distinction between historical justice and ongoing justice is very simple, and is based on when the original wrong took place. But I recognize that psychologically, many people will experience a failure to receive justice for a past wrong as an ongoing injustice of a sort. Nonetheless, in my conversations with people on all sides of this issue, it has become clear to me that however important past wrongs may be, it is the fear of future injuries that motivates much of the violence. Therefore, an agreement that is 'just' in the sense that it does not perpetuate further new injustice, is both attainable and worth attaining.

Lame is critical of the oft-heard slogan "no justice, no peace." When justice is defined as historical justice, or even procedural justice, I share Lame's views on this. I sometimes wonder if proponents of the slogan have ever taken a history course? Almost every country in the world is at peace with its neighbors. Yet many countries have a history of warfare with many of their neighbors. Of these hundreds of successfully resolve conflicts, I doubt that more than a tiny handful were resolved in a way which fully met the criteria for historical justice and/or procedural justice.

The world over, peace exists because belligerents learned to live with less than what they would consider full justice. However, I suspect that most of these functioning peaceful relationships are based on a high degree of ongoing justice. Without ongoing justice, the conflict isn't truly over, and is likely to flare up again into active warfare. Hence one might reasonably adopt the slogan: "no ongoing justice, no peace."

Hass: Gaza march besieged by Egypt & Hamas

Previously I shared with my email list my disappointment with Code Pink's representative not willing to address the Egyptian blockade. Then I sent a few emails about what happened to the demonstrators in Egypt---all this in order to show the complexity of what is going on. Although there are some who insist that Egypt refused admission into Gaza because they were pressured by the Israelis, I welcome Amira Hass' article (in Ha'aretz) because she writes about what the "freedom for Gaza" people faced once they got there. It is a dark and dismal time for the Gazans above all.

My informant, Racheli Gai, summarizes this article as follows:

Amira Hass was in Cairo during the stay of the Free Gaza March activists, and she went into Gaza with the small group that was allowed to enter (minus those who declined).

This article by Hass covers some of her impressions of the activists in Cairo, as well as what happened in Gaza. This last part has not been widely reported, especially the role of Hamas in keeping the visitors under tight control, and undermining the role of civil society groups in organizing and carrying out the Free Gaza March.

Responding to Ambassador Oren's smear

On Dec. 16, Meretz USA sent an open letter to Israel's Ambassador to the US, Michael Oren, expressing "our deep disappointment and great alarm over recent remarks with regard to the J Street organization, delivered at the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism's biennial convention.

"As a co-sponsor of J Street's recent national conference, your erroneous suggestion that J Street is hostile to Israel and to the Zionist idea was deeply troubling. ..." Read entire statement online.

In the meantime, J Street's head, Jeremy Ben-Ami, has responded to Ambassador Oren in an op-ed in the Jerusalem Post (a tip of the hat to Lilly Rivlin for finding this):

Being an Israeli ambassador these days can't be easy. On the one hand, you're working for a prime minister whose strong suit is public relations, who at least talks of peace with the Palestinians and who has consistently judged that engaging in the diplomatic process rather than refusing to talk plays better with domestic and international audiences.

On the other hand, you're working for a foreign minister who seems to have missed Diplomacy 101 during his orientation. This boss dismisses traditional diplomacy as "groveling" and prefers that Israel lecture the world rather than engage it.

Talk about a rock and a hard place. As one of your bosses talks up the Israeli interest in negotiation and compromise, the other pulls the country unflinchingly toward a racist, undemocratic future.

Along comes a pro-Israel lobby anxious to support the government if it moves beyond speeches about peace to serious action to end the occupation and save the country's Jewish and democratic character - and what should you do? ....

Read entire article online.

COPING WITH HAMAS by Paul Scham, Part 2

Moving Forward 



Rather than uncompromisingly opposing a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, it is in Israel’s interest to support this if it is possible (something Egypt has been attempting to facilitate). Bringing Hamas “inside the tent” is greatly preferable to keeping it outside.

Obviously, if such a coalition were to embrace violence, Israel would have to react in kind. Far more likely, however, is that such a coalition would accept the three Quartet demands which Hamas refuses to accept on its own, for Islamist ideological reasons, and would, unlike Fatah alone, be able to represent the majority of Palestinians. These demands are to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and to accept all previous agreements with Israel as valid. 



As an Islamist political party, Hamas cannot accept them. There is reason to believe, however, that it would join a government that does.



If and when a Fatah-Hamas coalition government is formed, Israel would have to modify the blockade it has clamped on the Gaza Strip. Other than as an initial response to attacks from Gaza, Israel’s ongoing reasons for the blockade appear to be:
• Freeing Gilad Shalit: Israel is loathe to free the large number of Palestinians with “blood on their hands” that Hamas demands in exchange. Still, as of this writing, a deal on Shalit seems imminent.
• Ending or seriously limiting weapons smuggling into Gaza from Egypt: This is the most important long-term issue for Israel and a potential deal-breaker. Hamas refuses as a matter of principle to limit its right to arms (contending that since Israel obtains arms, it should as well); additionally, Hamas argues that weapons smugglers are independent entrepreneurs over whom it has no control.

Egypt may succeed in eliminating or severely curtailing smuggling with a new type of fence it is reportedly building on its border with Gaza that would shut down all but the deepest tunnels. Israel is unlikely to agree to any further deal involving Hamas without a satisfactory resolution of this arms smuggling issue. 



The United States, in solidarity with Israel, has made complete opposition to Hamas a fundamental principle of its Mideast policy. It cannot abandon this policy completely, nor should it. What the US can do is to make clear that Hamas cannot be destroyed in the foreseeable future and to attempt a joint policy with Israel based on that recognition. 



The US should also examine the effect of the current blockade and siege of Gaza on Hamas’s policies, balanced against the prospect of Hamas complying with the Quartet’s three demands, the likelihood of the blockade holding up indefinitely, and its effect on world public opinion. Then Israel and the US can proceed to negotiate, perhaps through third parties, a building down of the current blockade in return for limitations on smuggling and an ongoing cease-fire. It is in the interest of the US to support Egyptian efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah so there can be a Palestinian interlocutor that truly represents the Palestinian population.



The US should take a consultative role in this process, as a supporter of Fatah. Hamas would be under pressure to further modify its traditional stance of refusing to recognize previous agreements, including Oslo, which it has already compromised by participating in elections held under the Oslo framework. Incentives would be offered for positive movement and sanctions imposed for negative actions.



If a coalition government is successfully formed, the US should carefully calibrate its dealings with it, depending on what Hamas has agreed to, and how it implements its promises. For example, the US would presumably refuse to meet with Hamas representatives in the government so long as Hamas does not recognize Israel.



In the larger Muslim world, this should be part of a winnowing process by which the US and its allies, including Israel, would begin actively to differentiate among Islamist organizations to determine which it can work with. This would constitute recognition that the most energetic and popular movements in the Muslim world and the Middle East today come almost completely from political/social movements, largely Islamist, rather than from state actors.



As noted, since the virtually universal Islamist view is that Israel is an illegitimate occupier of Muslim land, its formal recognition by Islamist organizations is currently unthinkable. This may change eventually, but is unlikely to in the near future. It is highly unlikely that Hamas will transgress this basic stricture though, as previously indicated, it may work with other groups that do, or try to finesse actual “recognition.”



This is not a pleasant fact for Israel. It has envisioned, since its founding, its eventual acceptance by the countries of the region and has achieved it, to a degree, with Egypt and Jordan. Israel, however, even with the support of the US, is not in a position to destroy the power of Islamism in the Middle East today or to dictate its ideology.



Thus, a means of coexistence may have to be developed that recognizes realities but does not surrender to them. For instance, as a quid pro quo for relaxing or eliminating its control of Palestinian borders, Israel might demand a degree of effective international control of those borders in the absence of fully normalized, bilateral relations.



This is coexistence, not peace. It is not the usual, or preferred, mode of relations between nations.

Since its founding in 1987, Hamas--through its organizational coherence, political shrewdness, ideological consistency, strategic use of violence, and a generous helping of mistakes by its adversaries--has made itself an indispensable part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Indispensable” is defined here as a party without which peaceful coexistence cannot be achieved. Israel needs to come to grips with this difficult reality.

COPING WITH HAMAS by Paul L. Scham, J.D.

The following is by Paul L. Scham, executive director of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland, where he is also a visiting assistant professor of Israel studies. A previous version of this paper received financial support from The Century Foundation. This updated version will be featured in the forthcoming winter 2010 issue of ISRAEL HORIZONS.

Some of the arguments made here are developed further in a paper by this author with Osama Abu-Irshaid, "Hamas: Ideological Rigidity, Political Flexibility," United States Institute of Peace Special Report, June 2009 (find online). The views expressed in this article are his own:

While providing a significant but incomplete measure of quiet along its border with the Gaza Strip, the results of Israel's massive assault ("Operation Cast Lead") in December 2008 and January '09 contradict the notion that Israel can effectively destroy or dismantle Hamas by force. This should bring to the fore what this paper argues is a more practical approach: to deal with Hamas as a hostile but rational entity that, in the long run, can be engaged and dealt with politically.


For years, Israelis have debated whether Hamas is analogous to the PLO in the 1970s and '80s, i.e., a militant, violent organization which eventually evolved into Israel’s negotiating partner. Unlike the prior situation with the PLO, however, Israel currently has no need to “recognize” Hamas. Hamas is not, nor does it claim to be, an independent government, despite its control of Gaza since 2007. Israel’s dealings are and will continue to be with the constituted authorities of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.



Hamas’s best-known document is its notorious Charter, adopted in August 1988. It is primarily an ideological document, asserting that all Palestine is an Islamic waqf (i.e., an endowment held for the benefit of all Muslims), which no Muslim has the right to surrender. It further states that only under Islam can Jews, Christians and Muslims live together peaceably in Palestine, and that Muslims will defeat the "Zionist invasion" as they defeated the Crusades. It also repeats a number of vintage antisemitic allegations reminiscent of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.



Were this the sole indication of Hamas’s intentions and strategies, there would clearly be no way of engaging Hamas. However, when set alongside other writings, statements and actions of the last 20 years, and especially of the last few years, some interesting paradoxes emerge. It becomes apparent that the Charter is not being used as a blueprint, or even a general guide. Hamas’s strategic as well as tactical decisions seem to be appreciably closer to its moderate statements than to its bloodcurdling Charter.



For example, Hamas Secretary General Khaled Meshal has said that Hamas accepts a “united Palestinian position” as embodied in the “Prisoners Document” (also known as “The National Reconciliation Document”), which calls for a Palestinian state next to an Israel within its 1949-’67 borders. This has been interpreted by some as recognition of Israel. Contrary to those who claim this is merely expedient lying, the weight of evidence indicates that, over time, Hamas’s leadership has made a deliberate and conscious choice to push off its long-term ideological objectives in favor of potentially attainable political solutions, and has been doing so since its inception.



However, the true test can only come when the organization is faced with realistic choices, not a “take it or leave it” diktat. Since Hamas still concludes that Israel has no intention of withdrawing to its 1949-'67 borders and allowing a sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, it believes there is no point in even considering giving up its military option.



This is not unprecedented. Fatah, the main component of the PLO, was as unalterably opposed to Israel’s existence in 1965, when its charter was drafted, as Hamas was in 1988, and maintained this opposition until the 1980s. Opponents of engagement argue that, unlike the situation a generation ago with Fatah, Hamas’s ideology cannot and will not change. The argument is that since Fatah is a secular nationalist organization, it could change in fundamental ways while Hamas, since it is theologically-grounded, cannot.

It is true that Hamas’s religious basis makes some difference. Hamas, in both theory and practice, fuses theology and politics. Traditionally, Islam does not make a distinction between the two, and modern Islamism is based on the political relevance of Islam. Nevertheless, recent history proves that ideological change takes place in the Muslim world, in the religious as well as the secular context. For example, while Turkey’s unique secularization process clearly differentiates its historical and political experience of the last 85 years from that of the Arab world, the fact that it has been ruled for seven years by a party with Islamist roots and has nevertheless retained close ties with the West and with Israel indicates Islamism can change and adapt even on fundamental issues. 



Regarding Hamas itself, Israeli scholar Shaul Mishal wrote in 2003: “Hamas leaders have been able to move publicly from an 'unrealistic' posture of conflict—of total moral commit­ment to a principle, whatever the cost—toward a more pragmatic bargaining posture, which recognizes that certain norms and interests are shared with the other side and can be used as a basis for a workable compromise.” While Hamas is unlikely to directly challenge the traditional Islamic doctrine providing that Palestine constitutes an Islamic waqf, there is reason to believe that, if there is sufficient motivation to coexist with Israel, appropriate theological interpretations will be developed to justify this. 



Marwan Muasher, probably the best-known of the younger generation of Jordanian leaders (its former ambassador to Israel and to the US, and a former foreign minister) classifies Islamist organizations in three camps: First, those whose violent ideology will never allow them to compromise, for whom the fight against the West and against other Muslims will never cease, such as al-Qaeda; second, those “who have sprung up because of the occupation of their countries, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the West Bank” but “have one [hand] carrying arms and the other hand inside the political system”; and third, those “who have always been peaceful, who have never carried arms” (citing inter alia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, a close ally of Hamas). One of the main tasks of moderates, he believes, must be to bring the second group closer to the third than to the first.



Rather than dividing the world into friends and enemies, Muasher posits a shifting political and ideological universe in which allies, adversaries, strategies, and goals are objects of continuous reexamination. It does not ignore values but, rather, recognizes that interpretations and intentions invariably change, and that the wise strategist always seeks his or her advantage. Conflict is not always avoidable, but enemies and their ideologies are rarely annihilated by conflict, despite even apocalyptic rhetoric. He concludes that forces of moderation must seek to find elements of common ground, which may include previously unexplored modes of coexistence.



A comparison of Hamas with al-Qaeda can be instructive:

1. Al-Qaeda is fundamentally seeking to recreate the seventh century age of the caliphs. In contrast, Hamas’s leadership is composed largely of highly-educated professionals who seek to harness modernity with Islam.
2. Al-Qaeda has no use for nationalism. Hamas, however, defines itself as the vanguard of Palestinian nationalism and has indicated an interest in joining the PLO.
3. Hamas has participated in a free, Western-monitored electoral process, while al-Qaeda fundamentally rejects democracy as contrary to Islamic governance.
4. Hamas has worked hard to convince both the West and the Arab governments that it is not a threat to them. It has never attacked the United States or another country (other than Israel). It has done its best to keep al-Qaeda out of Gaza, and has suppressed its supporters (including in a deadly shoot-out, a few months ago). Of course, that is to maintain its own hegemony, but it proves there is no love lost between these two very different Islamist movements.
   Continue to Part 2...

Simon Petlyura: Ukrainian hero and pogromist

Larry Bush, editor of Jewish Currents magazine, has been sending out a daily email, which he calls "Jewdayo," with little-known or forgotten tidbits of Jewish history. A tip of my hat to him for today's installment:

On this day in 1919, Simon Petlyura, Ukrainian writer, Cossack commander, and head of the break-away Ukrainian state during the civil war that followed the Bolshevik Revolution, began attacking Jews in a sustained wave of violence that took the lives of tens of thousands. Hundreds of cities and towns were attacked; thousands of Jewish women were raped; half a million Jews were left homeless.

In 1926, Petlyura was assassinated in Paris by Sholom Schwartzbard, a Jewish anarchist and Yiddish writer who had lost fifteen members of his family, including his parents, in pogroms in Odessa. Testimony at Schwartzbard’s trial revealed the depth of the anti-Jewish carnage in the Ukraine (committed both by Ukrainian nationalists and White Russian forces) and led to his acquittal.

In the Ukraine, Petlyura is a nationalist hero, with a street named for him in Kiev. In Israel, Schwartzbard is honored with a plaque on Hanoken (“The Avenger”) Street in Beersheba.