For such a small minority, it is amazing that Jews figure prominently on all sides of great economic and political debates. We've got Murray Rothbard, Ludwig von Misses and Milton Friedman on the laissez-faire right; we've got Jewish neocons; we've got Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernancke at the Federal Reserve; and Bob Rubin and Larry Summers left over from the Clinton administration--with Robert Reich, also a Clinton alum, on their left flank. I've almost forgotten the left-liberal Nobel Prize-winning economists, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. Then we've got the old-line Jewish banking families: Rothschild, Lehman, Goldman, Schiff, Warburg, Loeb and a few others--not to mention Jewish commies like Trotsky, Luxembourg and Marx (at least at his birth).
Since these Jews are of all colors (politically speaking), shouldn't this refute Jewish conspiracy theorists? Instead, it likely reinforces antisemitic notions of Jews as all-powerful. And antisemitic tropes are again seeping into anti-Federal Reserve and anti-Wall Street attitudes.
Glenn Beck's analysis is quite nutty and inadvertently borders on antisemitism (I believe it's inadvertent). His attacks on the "demonic" influence of George Soros are truly idiotic, and his notion that this boyhood survivor of the Holocaust worked with the Nazis is outrageous. For one thing, Jewish collaborators were virtually all eventually murdered (it was just a matter of when for the Nazis). For another, what on earth could a mere boy do for them anyway?
Haaretz columnist Carlo Strenger has just posted a new piece on the Huffington Post that addresses right-wing populist conspiratorial thinking. While focusing upon Beck's obsession with Soros, Strenger also touches upon other international manifestations, including Lieberman in Israel:
".... Glenn Beck is telling America that there is a man about to bring down the world's only Superpower, to undermine the United States of America. He will topple it, as he has toppled currencies and governments in the past. He is the puppet master who pulls all the strings. It is the foreign-born Jew George Soros.
".... Beck's claims veer between the ugly (Soros is really an anti-Semite who cooperated with the Nazis) and the incoherent: after showing a number of instances in which Soros was indeed active in undermining communist regimes through his Open Democracy network, Beck concludes that this is proof that Soros is now trying to undermine the US. Could it be that he missed the simple facts that Soros indeed tries to undermine autocratic regimes, and that his network is called 'Open Society Network'? Or is Beck so busy trying to paint Soros as a dangerous alien that he just counts on his viewer's ignorance about the difference between fighting for democracy and 'undermining regimes' in general?
"Beck's targeting of Soros, whether knowingly or not, feeds on the most common tropes of anti-Semitism since the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the notorious anti-Semitic forgery from the beginning of the twentieth century. The Protocols depict Jews as a cosmopolitan network that controls the world; they don't really belong anywhere, and that's why they try to control the world by manipulating it. With an elegant sleight of hand, Beck avoids the anti-Semitism charge by standing it on its head, and accusing Soros of being an anti-Semite who stole Jewish property in WWII. Again, the question is whether this is a devilish sleight of hand, or whether Beck doesn't see what he's doing.
"Beck is riding on a sentiment that has served right-wingers in many countries: the humiliation caused by ignorance. There are indeed many, and not only in the US, who feel humiliated by the vast systemic forces that threaten their jobs and livelihood. They don't quite understand what went wrong; they don't really know what needs to be done.
".... And they are taking it out on Barack Hussein Obama, even though he has averted a total meltdown of the economy and probably saved American capitalism. ...
"Underlying this is what even the Tea Partiers and Glenn Beck don't really feel comfortable saying: he's black. And to top it, he has the chutzpah of being Harvard educated. He's not one of ours, and hence he should not claim, as he does, that he is really the embodiment of the American dream. Like Soros, Obama is a foreign element. He's too cosmopolitan; he's too rationalist; he's too cool. He doesn't remind many Americans of themselves. They feel governed by an outsider.
"It must be emphasized, once again, that there is nothing original, and nothing particularly American about Beck's tactics. Jean-Marie le Pen has made a long-standing political career for himself feeding on xenophobia in France; the late Joerg Haider did very well in Austria riding on the same sentiment; and Israel currently has Avigdor Lieberman, who is amassing political power by fanning hatred of Israel's Arab citizens. ..."
VISIT OUR WEBSITE AT partners4israel.org .
The Partners for Progressive Israel Blog (formerly Meretz USA Blog) is a platform for open discussion of issues related to Israel and the American Jewish community. The views expressed in its posts, and the comments on them, do not necessarily reflect the organization's official position.
Subscribe to our RSS Feed
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Monday, November 29, 2010
T. Mitchell on book by Ross & Makovsky
Independent scholar, Thomas Mitchell, Ph.D., contributes the following review of "Myths, Illusions and Peace" by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky (Viking 2009, $27.95):
It is rumored that George Mitchell has tired of wrangling with the Israelis, Palestinians and Syrians and will soon return to a much-deserved retirement with his wife and young son. The rumor mill has his replacement as either Martin Indyk, who was twice ambassador to Israel as well as assistant secretary of state for the region, or Dennis Ross, who served as Mitchell’s equivalent during the Clinton years and now works in the Obama administration.
In this book, co-authored with David Makovsky, who specializes in covering peace process issues at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Ross writes mainly about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Iran. A third is devoted to Iran, which is Ross’s fiefdom in the Obama administration at present.
The book is structured in three parts (the peace process, Iran, U.S. regional interests), which the authors start by laying out in separate chapters the arguments of his two foils, the neo-conservatives and the realists―the latter primarily being John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The two authors then make their policy recommendations for the Obama administration. Obama's policy towards Iran since January 2009 seems to be following the trajectory laid out by the two: multilateral negotiations, sanctions first negotiated between Washington and its European allies and Moscow.
They begin by building up a straw man, based on quotes from Arab leaders and the Iraq Study Group, that negotiating peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict will result in an outbreak of peace throughout the region. They then quickly hangs his straw man in effigy while acknowledging that the lack of peace causes enough problems for the U.S. to make its solution an American interest. A chapter discusses this “linkage” from the Roosevelt administration in the late 1930s to the Carter administration 40 years later. This is interesting historical background but reveals nothing new.
Where Ross and Makovsky fail is in acknowledging that both the realists and the neocons are partly right and that this needs to be taken into account in developing American policy. The neocons are right in arguing that there is a considerable lack of interest in peace on the Arab side (which the authors acknowledge but portray mainly as passivity). The realists are right in arguing that only American pressure can lead to peace―but they want the pressure aimed only at Israel.
Ross and Makovsky never really tackle the two main obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian peace: the Israeli party system and the ongoing struggle for supremacy between Fatah and Hamas. This means that both ends of the Palestinian track are blocked. While Washington has little leverage over the Palestinian side, particularly over the Islamists, it does have considerable leverage over Israel. Instead of engaging in further iterations of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks that are collapsing even at the opening ceremony, Washington could be engaged in working to remove these structural blockages.
It is typical that the authors have a chapter on democratization in the Middle East but never discuss Israel as a potential target of American efforts. Building a more stable and functional Israeli democracy where ruling coalitions do not collapse as soon as serious peace negotiations begin is even more of an American interest than democratizing the Arab world―and one much more likely to succeed. The immediate target should be a serious electoral reform by either replacing the proportional representation-list system with another type of PR franchise such as the mixed list and district-constituency system in Germany or by considerably raising the entry barrier to the Knesset under the present franchise system.
The leverage to be used in such an effort is Israel’s considerable fear of Tehran’s nuclear efforts. Washington could offer to bring Jerusalem’s nuclear infrastructure in from the cold as it did with India in exchange for Israeli electoral reform. Or it could do this in exchange for a Cuban missile crisis style declaration that a nuclear attack by Tehran on any American ally in the region would be considered as an attack on the United States.
The two have a chapter on Hamas and Hezbollah and argue quite cogently why the Northern Ireland precedent of negotiations with Sinn Fein does not point to unconditional negotiations with either terrorist organization. I think that it is quite likely that someday Israel may have to negotiate with elements of Hamas, after they have come to realize that they cannot destroy Israel and that Palestinian interests are best served by a negotiated peace leading to the creation of a Palestinian state.
This book is most valuable as a guide to conventional thinking in Washington on the Middle East. I'm either being cynical or realistic in expecting that after Ross and Obama fail, maybe some other wise man (or woman) can write a book explaining their failure and how his or her policy recommendations are superior.
It is rumored that George Mitchell has tired of wrangling with the Israelis, Palestinians and Syrians and will soon return to a much-deserved retirement with his wife and young son. The rumor mill has his replacement as either Martin Indyk, who was twice ambassador to Israel as well as assistant secretary of state for the region, or Dennis Ross, who served as Mitchell’s equivalent during the Clinton years and now works in the Obama administration.
In this book, co-authored with David Makovsky, who specializes in covering peace process issues at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Ross writes mainly about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Iran. A third is devoted to Iran, which is Ross’s fiefdom in the Obama administration at present.
The book is structured in three parts (the peace process, Iran, U.S. regional interests), which the authors start by laying out in separate chapters the arguments of his two foils, the neo-conservatives and the realists―the latter primarily being John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The two authors then make their policy recommendations for the Obama administration. Obama's policy towards Iran since January 2009 seems to be following the trajectory laid out by the two: multilateral negotiations, sanctions first negotiated between Washington and its European allies and Moscow.
They begin by building up a straw man, based on quotes from Arab leaders and the Iraq Study Group, that negotiating peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict will result in an outbreak of peace throughout the region. They then quickly hangs his straw man in effigy while acknowledging that the lack of peace causes enough problems for the U.S. to make its solution an American interest. A chapter discusses this “linkage” from the Roosevelt administration in the late 1930s to the Carter administration 40 years later. This is interesting historical background but reveals nothing new.
Where Ross and Makovsky fail is in acknowledging that both the realists and the neocons are partly right and that this needs to be taken into account in developing American policy. The neocons are right in arguing that there is a considerable lack of interest in peace on the Arab side (which the authors acknowledge but portray mainly as passivity). The realists are right in arguing that only American pressure can lead to peace―but they want the pressure aimed only at Israel.
Ross and Makovsky never really tackle the two main obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian peace: the Israeli party system and the ongoing struggle for supremacy between Fatah and Hamas. This means that both ends of the Palestinian track are blocked. While Washington has little leverage over the Palestinian side, particularly over the Islamists, it does have considerable leverage over Israel. Instead of engaging in further iterations of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks that are collapsing even at the opening ceremony, Washington could be engaged in working to remove these structural blockages.
It is typical that the authors have a chapter on democratization in the Middle East but never discuss Israel as a potential target of American efforts. Building a more stable and functional Israeli democracy where ruling coalitions do not collapse as soon as serious peace negotiations begin is even more of an American interest than democratizing the Arab world―and one much more likely to succeed. The immediate target should be a serious electoral reform by either replacing the proportional representation-list system with another type of PR franchise such as the mixed list and district-constituency system in Germany or by considerably raising the entry barrier to the Knesset under the present franchise system.
The leverage to be used in such an effort is Israel’s considerable fear of Tehran’s nuclear efforts. Washington could offer to bring Jerusalem’s nuclear infrastructure in from the cold as it did with India in exchange for Israeli electoral reform. Or it could do this in exchange for a Cuban missile crisis style declaration that a nuclear attack by Tehran on any American ally in the region would be considered as an attack on the United States.
The two have a chapter on Hamas and Hezbollah and argue quite cogently why the Northern Ireland precedent of negotiations with Sinn Fein does not point to unconditional negotiations with either terrorist organization. I think that it is quite likely that someday Israel may have to negotiate with elements of Hamas, after they have come to realize that they cannot destroy Israel and that Palestinian interests are best served by a negotiated peace leading to the creation of a Palestinian state.
This book is most valuable as a guide to conventional thinking in Washington on the Middle East. I'm either being cynical or realistic in expecting that after Ross and Obama fail, maybe some other wise man (or woman) can write a book explaining their failure and how his or her policy recommendations are superior.
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
UNRWA head is 'pro-Israel' and anti-BDS
In a NY Jewish Week web-only feature, Julie Wiener interviews John Ging, the head of the UN relief agency in Gaza, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, under the heading, "UNRWA Head: Don't Boycott Israel." The Columbia University branch of J Street U (called "Just Peace") was prohibited by the campus Hillel from co-sponsoring Ging's recent talk at Columbia, upon pain of being expelled from the university's coalition of Jewish groups.
UNRWA has a very bad reputation in most of the pro-Israel community, for allegedly maintaining generations of Palestinians in dependent refugee status and in other ways acting out of an anti-Israel agenda. Yet a Meretz USA board member who attended his talk was impressed by his integrity and fairness in discussing the acrimonious issues related to Gaza. This is part of the Q & A carried on The Jewish Week's website:
What about allegations that UNRWA staff members have been involved in terrorist activities?
We have a staff of 11,500 so of course we’re vulnerable to being betrayed. The question is what systems are in place to prevent. The last time we were betrayed, we fired the supervisors and told them if they didn’t know, they should have, and if they did know, they should have told us. Our staff’s job is to deliver humanitarian services for the UN. They sign every year a statement that they won’t be engaged in anything else whether they’re on duty or off duty. We have a zero tolerance policy. ....
Do you support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, and how do you feel about the boycott/divestment/sanctions movement?
The last time I was in the States I attended a celebration for Israel’s independence day with the Israelis at the UN. They know I’m pro-Israel. I celebrate Israel’s independence … It’s a concern that those representing themselves as pro-Palestinian are now linking that to anti-Israel sentiment and policies like divestment and boycott. I oppose that … The people of Israel need efforts to rebuild confidence that peace can be brought about. Talking about sanctions and boycotts is not going to bring about anything positive …
UNRWA has a very bad reputation in most of the pro-Israel community, for allegedly maintaining generations of Palestinians in dependent refugee status and in other ways acting out of an anti-Israel agenda. Yet a Meretz USA board member who attended his talk was impressed by his integrity and fairness in discussing the acrimonious issues related to Gaza. This is part of the Q & A carried on The Jewish Week's website:
What about allegations that UNRWA staff members have been involved in terrorist activities?
We have a staff of 11,500 so of course we’re vulnerable to being betrayed. The question is what systems are in place to prevent. The last time we were betrayed, we fired the supervisors and told them if they didn’t know, they should have, and if they did know, they should have told us. Our staff’s job is to deliver humanitarian services for the UN. They sign every year a statement that they won’t be engaged in anything else whether they’re on duty or off duty. We have a zero tolerance policy. ....
Do you support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, and how do you feel about the boycott/divestment/sanctions movement?
The last time I was in the States I attended a celebration for Israel’s independence day with the Israelis at the UN. They know I’m pro-Israel. I celebrate Israel’s independence … It’s a concern that those representing themselves as pro-Palestinian are now linking that to anti-Israel sentiment and policies like divestment and boycott. I oppose that … The people of Israel need efforts to rebuild confidence that peace can be brought about. Talking about sanctions and boycotts is not going to bring about anything positive …
Monday, November 22, 2010
Gorenberg: New US deal is 'Freezing Netanyahu'
In an article in The NY Jewish Week entitled "Game Changer in the Wings?," its Washington correspondent, James Besser, surveys informed opinions on the pending deal to extend Israel's moratorium in the West Bank. The subhead indicates a guessing game in Washington:
"Incentives package to Israel has analysts wondering what–if anything– is up U.S.’s sleeve." Basically, there's speculation on what may really be expected of Israel in return for what seems on the surface to be a very generous incentive package for a seemingly small Israeli concession in foregoing settlement activity for a mere 90 days, and not in East Jerusalem.
Writing in The American Prospect, its Israel correspondent, Gershom Gorenberg, observes that, "Despite the appearance of wild generosity, Obama and Clinton could have Netanyahu in a very tight spot." The following is an abridged version of his article available online:
.... The American incentives, we've heard, include those 20 advanced war planes, a pledge to veto anti-Israel measures in the Security Council for the next year and to prevent international supervision of Israel's nuclear installations, and more pressure on Iran to stop nuclear-arms development. ... The offer of the planes is not exactly unusual in U.S.-Israeli relations. It fits the consistent policy since 1967 of giving Israel the means to defend itself, so that the United States will not have to. Providing arms is also a way of creating jobs stateside. It's likely that the F-35 deal was already in the works and has now been made contingent on Israeli actions.
As for the diplomatic moves, these are all things that Washington is already doing. In fact, "keeping up pressure on Iran" is a backward way of saying, "not answering your request to send in our Air Force." As for American vetoes in the Security Council, this is an old tradition. As Yediot Aharonot columnist Nahum Barnea noted this week, "A tradition is difficult to break. A clause in a contract, however, can be broken," if the other party hasn't kept its side of the agreement.
In other words, the carrots are really sticks. The U.S. offer translates as, "When Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad carries out his plan to declare a state next year, you want us to veto U.N. recognition? Stop the cement-mixers. You want us to keep the inspectors away from your reactor? Please see the instructions above."
These are very significant threats. Are they worth wasting on a three-month, nonrenewable settlement freeze?
Look again at the other side of the deal. Renewing the freeze is intended to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. For Israel to get those "incentives," the administration reportedly requires that the first subject on the agenda be the permanent borders between Israel and Palestine -- apparently with the goal that both sides sign off on them even before negotiating the rest of a peace agreement. The logic is simple: "Mr. Netanyahu, you want to keep building settlements without them getting in the way of peace? Once you've agreed with Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas on borders, you can build any part of the West Bank that you're going to keep. Then you can go to negotiate the rest of the peace agreement."
.... Besides that, the latest leaks (in Hebrew) say that Washington has never exactly promised that these three months will be the last freeze it requests. Perhaps Netanyahu did not quite understand what Clinton was telling him during those seven hours. Perhaps the claim that this would be the final freeze was spin intended to persuade his political allies to support the deal. If so, it didn't work. One of the "clarifications" that Netanyahu now wants from Washington is a commitment that Israel won't be asked for a further concession.
.... If he wins Cabinet approval for the American plan, he will be under heavy pressure to agree on boundaries before reaching a full peace accord. If his government rejects America's offer, he will stand responsible before the Israeli public for possible Security Council ratification of Palestinian statehood, for not getting the F-35s, perhaps even for some very curious international inspectors asking for a good look at Israeli reactors.
Netanyahu has two obvious options for avoiding this dilemma: He could impose an open-ended, complete freeze on all settlement construction in occupied territory, including East Jerusalem, until a final-status agreement is signed. Or he could strive to reach such a deal in the next three months, in order to get his money's worth for withdrawal. This shouldn't be as hard as it sounds. The shape of an agreement has been clear for years. Starting with the unofficial Geneva Accord of 2003, for instance, would take care of nearly all the work.
But the problem isn't just that Netanyahu's coalition partners aren't willing to do either of those things or that his own Likud Party might depose him. It's that Netanyahu himself doesn't want to reach an agreement....
"Incentives package to Israel has analysts wondering what–if anything– is up U.S.’s sleeve." Basically, there's speculation on what may really be expected of Israel in return for what seems on the surface to be a very generous incentive package for a seemingly small Israeli concession in foregoing settlement activity for a mere 90 days, and not in East Jerusalem.
Writing in The American Prospect, its Israel correspondent, Gershom Gorenberg, observes that, "Despite the appearance of wild generosity, Obama and Clinton could have Netanyahu in a very tight spot." The following is an abridged version of his article available online:
.... The American incentives, we've heard, include those 20 advanced war planes, a pledge to veto anti-Israel measures in the Security Council for the next year and to prevent international supervision of Israel's nuclear installations, and more pressure on Iran to stop nuclear-arms development. ... The offer of the planes is not exactly unusual in U.S.-Israeli relations. It fits the consistent policy since 1967 of giving Israel the means to defend itself, so that the United States will not have to. Providing arms is also a way of creating jobs stateside. It's likely that the F-35 deal was already in the works and has now been made contingent on Israeli actions.
As for the diplomatic moves, these are all things that Washington is already doing. In fact, "keeping up pressure on Iran" is a backward way of saying, "not answering your request to send in our Air Force." As for American vetoes in the Security Council, this is an old tradition. As Yediot Aharonot columnist Nahum Barnea noted this week, "A tradition is difficult to break. A clause in a contract, however, can be broken," if the other party hasn't kept its side of the agreement.
In other words, the carrots are really sticks. The U.S. offer translates as, "When Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad carries out his plan to declare a state next year, you want us to veto U.N. recognition? Stop the cement-mixers. You want us to keep the inspectors away from your reactor? Please see the instructions above."
These are very significant threats. Are they worth wasting on a three-month, nonrenewable settlement freeze?
Look again at the other side of the deal. Renewing the freeze is intended to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. For Israel to get those "incentives," the administration reportedly requires that the first subject on the agenda be the permanent borders between Israel and Palestine -- apparently with the goal that both sides sign off on them even before negotiating the rest of a peace agreement. The logic is simple: "Mr. Netanyahu, you want to keep building settlements without them getting in the way of peace? Once you've agreed with Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas on borders, you can build any part of the West Bank that you're going to keep. Then you can go to negotiate the rest of the peace agreement."
.... Besides that, the latest leaks (in Hebrew) say that Washington has never exactly promised that these three months will be the last freeze it requests. Perhaps Netanyahu did not quite understand what Clinton was telling him during those seven hours. Perhaps the claim that this would be the final freeze was spin intended to persuade his political allies to support the deal. If so, it didn't work. One of the "clarifications" that Netanyahu now wants from Washington is a commitment that Israel won't be asked for a further concession.
.... If he wins Cabinet approval for the American plan, he will be under heavy pressure to agree on boundaries before reaching a full peace accord. If his government rejects America's offer, he will stand responsible before the Israeli public for possible Security Council ratification of Palestinian statehood, for not getting the F-35s, perhaps even for some very curious international inspectors asking for a good look at Israeli reactors.
Netanyahu has two obvious options for avoiding this dilemma: He could impose an open-ended, complete freeze on all settlement construction in occupied territory, including East Jerusalem, until a final-status agreement is signed. Or he could strive to reach such a deal in the next three months, in order to get his money's worth for withdrawal. This shouldn't be as hard as it sounds. The shape of an agreement has been clear for years. Starting with the unofficial Geneva Accord of 2003, for instance, would take care of nearly all the work.
But the problem isn't just that Netanyahu's coalition partners aren't willing to do either of those things or that his own Likud Party might depose him. It's that Netanyahu himself doesn't want to reach an agreement....
Friday, November 19, 2010
Rosen’s Anti-Peace Work Is The Issue, Not Sex
Just because someone is on "the other side" doesn't mean you sacrifice your values to attack him.
In the course of those events, AIPAC first defended Rosen and his fellow accused Keith Weissman, but eventually reversed course and made the case that Rosen and Weissman were acting outside the bounds of acceptable conduct for AIPAC. Rosen since responded with a defamation suit.
Now, some really distasteful stuff is going on around this. For background on that, check out this article in The Forward. But part of AIPAC's attempt to embarrass Rosen into withdrawing his suit has been to reveal that he sometimes sought out sexual encounters with other men. The nature of the accusation itself, as well as some of the reporting on it (including some from progressives) crosses the line to homophobia, in my view.
I wrote a short article on this matter. Please check it out at The Third Way.
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Violence not legitimate in Jewish discourse
Meretz USA president, Moises Salinas, has issued this statement on behalf of Meretz USA:
Meretz USA is deeply concerned by the violent incident that took place between rival Jewish groups this week, in which two activists of Jewish Voice for Peace were pepper-sprayed by a member of StandWithUs/San Francisco Voice For Israel.
Meretz USA is deeply concerned by the violent incident that took place between rival Jewish groups this week, in which two activists of Jewish Voice for Peace were pepper-sprayed by a member of StandWithUs/San Francisco Voice For Israel.
Michael Lame: 'New Negotiators Needed'
I AGREE WITH MICHAEL LAME THAT WE NEED SOME FRESH THINKING.-- LILLY
The “peace process” in the Middle East lurches along from crisis to crisis. Since President Obama took office, George Mitchell has served as his special envoy to the region, with his energies focused primarily on bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a peaceful conclusion. Yet the primary diplomatic subject of conversation about the conflict in 2009-10 has been 1) how to re-start direct talks between the parties, and 2) how to keep them going. A few substantive matters have also been on the agenda – continued Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and east Jerusalem; an easing of the Gaza blockade; and the Jewishness of the state of Israel that Palestinians will be asked to acknowledge. But no meaningful discussion has taken place on the most basic issues: refugees, Jerusalem, borders, security.
Saeb Erekat, the PLO’s chief negotiator for many years now, gave an impassioned, if slightly irrational speech, at the Middle East Institute’s annual conference last week, before going on to the Woodrow Wilson Center for a public conversation with Aaron David Miller. During his MEI talk and the Q&A, he repeated the phrase “two-state solution” dozens of times. Since President Obama favors a two-state solution, Erekat asked rhetorically, why wouldn’t he support a UN Security Council resolution in support of a unilaterally-declared Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders? But Erekat certainly knows that the President won’t support such a move, as the U.S. State Department spokesperson P. J. Crowley made clear the next day.
According to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper coverage of the Wilson Center event, Erekat said that "we have concluded the issue of negotiations, and now is the time for decisions, for everybody knows the form of the solution, we know where territory exchange will take place and we have found a solution to eastern Jerusalem and the mechanism that will determine this, and we also know the solution to the issues of refugees and security." This is a demonstrably false statement. The Abbas and Netanyahu governments have not discussed Jerusalem and refugees, the conversation about borders has not begun in earnest, while both sides wrangle over a continuation of Israel’s settlement moratorium (or rather the partial slowdown of building in the West Bank).
Perhaps Erekat was referring to former Prime Minister Olmert’s offer to Abbas in 2008, but that offer was not accepted by Abbas and is no longer on the table. Regarding the final status issues, the two sides have not yet agreed on almost anything. I say “almost” because one element of a future deal has been clear since Israel evacuated all settlers and soldiers from Gaza in 2005: a Palestinian state will include 100% of the Gaza Strip. If previous negotiations are any guide, it will also comprise more than 90% of the West Bank, but whether that’s closer to 90% or to 100% is unknown. A narrowing of differences does not constitute a meeting of the minds.
Why do the parties continue to employ the same representatives, like Erekat, in round after round of negotiations when these representatives have failed time after time to achieve peace? When is failure in the Middle East ever grounds for dismissal? ....
One can read the rest of this piece at the "Re-Think The Middle East" website.
The “peace process” in the Middle East lurches along from crisis to crisis. Since President Obama took office, George Mitchell has served as his special envoy to the region, with his energies focused primarily on bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a peaceful conclusion. Yet the primary diplomatic subject of conversation about the conflict in 2009-10 has been 1) how to re-start direct talks between the parties, and 2) how to keep them going. A few substantive matters have also been on the agenda – continued Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and east Jerusalem; an easing of the Gaza blockade; and the Jewishness of the state of Israel that Palestinians will be asked to acknowledge. But no meaningful discussion has taken place on the most basic issues: refugees, Jerusalem, borders, security.
Saeb Erekat, the PLO’s chief negotiator for many years now, gave an impassioned, if slightly irrational speech, at the Middle East Institute’s annual conference last week, before going on to the Woodrow Wilson Center for a public conversation with Aaron David Miller. During his MEI talk and the Q&A, he repeated the phrase “two-state solution” dozens of times. Since President Obama favors a two-state solution, Erekat asked rhetorically, why wouldn’t he support a UN Security Council resolution in support of a unilaterally-declared Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders? But Erekat certainly knows that the President won’t support such a move, as the U.S. State Department spokesperson P. J. Crowley made clear the next day.
According to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper coverage of the Wilson Center event, Erekat said that "we have concluded the issue of negotiations, and now is the time for decisions, for everybody knows the form of the solution, we know where territory exchange will take place and we have found a solution to eastern Jerusalem and the mechanism that will determine this, and we also know the solution to the issues of refugees and security." This is a demonstrably false statement. The Abbas and Netanyahu governments have not discussed Jerusalem and refugees, the conversation about borders has not begun in earnest, while both sides wrangle over a continuation of Israel’s settlement moratorium (or rather the partial slowdown of building in the West Bank).
Perhaps Erekat was referring to former Prime Minister Olmert’s offer to Abbas in 2008, but that offer was not accepted by Abbas and is no longer on the table. Regarding the final status issues, the two sides have not yet agreed on almost anything. I say “almost” because one element of a future deal has been clear since Israel evacuated all settlers and soldiers from Gaza in 2005: a Palestinian state will include 100% of the Gaza Strip. If previous negotiations are any guide, it will also comprise more than 90% of the West Bank, but whether that’s closer to 90% or to 100% is unknown. A narrowing of differences does not constitute a meeting of the minds.
Why do the parties continue to employ the same representatives, like Erekat, in round after round of negotiations when these representatives have failed time after time to achieve peace? When is failure in the Middle East ever grounds for dismissal? ....
One can read the rest of this piece at the "Re-Think The Middle East" website.
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Saudi Arabia & UN Women: 'A Sad Joke'
For those of you I've reached for a long time, you remember Mona Eltahawy's columns I am sure. Here is another memorable one. Please pass it on. Mona is always right on, but the sentence that is the truest in this column is below: "Once again, women are the cheapest bargaining chips, thrown on the table to silence and appease allies and 'major donors'.” --Lilly
"Saudi Arabia's Spot on the Board of UN Women [is] a Sad Joke" By Mona Eltahawy Toronto Star Nov. 14, 2010
It took years to make the United Nations' newest agency, UN Women, a reality, and then just one day to effectively kill it. Death was effected by allowing onto its board a kingdom where women are not just infamously prohibited from driving but are also virtual minors who need a male guardian's permission to travel and to have surgery — and must be covered from head to toe in public.
As one of two countries guaranteed seats as emerging donor nations, Saudi Arabia essentially bought its way onto the board of UN Women, which is dedicated to gender equality around the world.
Just three days after securing an automatic seat, Saudi Arabia gave us a reminder of just how oxymoronic its place on UN Women is, when its team showed up at the Asian Games in China without a single woman among the 180-strong delegation.
Iran, another country with a dismal women's rights record, lost its bid for election to the board of UN Women after furious back-channel diplomacy by the United States and its allies. Still, at the games, which started in China on Saturday, Iran will field 92 female athletes in its 395-strong delegation.
Welcome to the ugly world of wrangling over women's rights records depending on whether “we” like you or not.
Don't misunderstand — Iran deserves to be kept out of UN Women. Iranian Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi had warned just before the vote that it was a “joke” that her country was in line to get a place on the board. But she said the same of Saudi Arabia, rightly pointing out that its women's rights record was worse than Iran's. ...
U.S., European Union, Australian and Canadian diplomats had been working hard to kick Iran off the list of 10 countries from the Asian region up for election to the board. Iran — which for weeks has been threatening to stone a woman for alleged adultery — does not belong on the board.
But it was disgusting to hear American ambassador to the UN Susan E. Rice celebrate Iran's defeat and yet, when pushed on Saudi Arabia, say only that she would “not deny that there were several countries that are going to join the board of UN women that have less than stellar records on women's rights, indeed human rights.”
Once again, women are the cheapest bargaining chips, thrown on the table to silence and appease allies and “major donors.”
.... If UN Women is to have any bite, it should focus on justice for Saudi women and not on their country's “generous contributions.”
Read this entire piece online.
"Saudi Arabia's Spot on the Board of UN Women [is] a Sad Joke" By Mona Eltahawy Toronto Star Nov. 14, 2010
It took years to make the United Nations' newest agency, UN Women, a reality, and then just one day to effectively kill it. Death was effected by allowing onto its board a kingdom where women are not just infamously prohibited from driving but are also virtual minors who need a male guardian's permission to travel and to have surgery — and must be covered from head to toe in public.
As one of two countries guaranteed seats as emerging donor nations, Saudi Arabia essentially bought its way onto the board of UN Women, which is dedicated to gender equality around the world.
Just three days after securing an automatic seat, Saudi Arabia gave us a reminder of just how oxymoronic its place on UN Women is, when its team showed up at the Asian Games in China without a single woman among the 180-strong delegation.
Iran, another country with a dismal women's rights record, lost its bid for election to the board of UN Women after furious back-channel diplomacy by the United States and its allies. Still, at the games, which started in China on Saturday, Iran will field 92 female athletes in its 395-strong delegation.
Welcome to the ugly world of wrangling over women's rights records depending on whether “we” like you or not.
Don't misunderstand — Iran deserves to be kept out of UN Women. Iranian Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi had warned just before the vote that it was a “joke” that her country was in line to get a place on the board. But she said the same of Saudi Arabia, rightly pointing out that its women's rights record was worse than Iran's. ...
U.S., European Union, Australian and Canadian diplomats had been working hard to kick Iran off the list of 10 countries from the Asian region up for election to the board. Iran — which for weeks has been threatening to stone a woman for alleged adultery — does not belong on the board.
But it was disgusting to hear American ambassador to the UN Susan E. Rice celebrate Iran's defeat and yet, when pushed on Saudi Arabia, say only that she would “not deny that there were several countries that are going to join the board of UN women that have less than stellar records on women's rights, indeed human rights.”
Once again, women are the cheapest bargaining chips, thrown on the table to silence and appease allies and “major donors.”
.... If UN Women is to have any bite, it should focus on justice for Saudi women and not on their country's “generous contributions.”
Read this entire piece online.
Monday, November 15, 2010
Benny Morris and 'ID Blues'
New York's wonderful Other Israel Film Festival featured "ID Blues: Jewish and Democratic," the final installment of Chaim Yavin's penetrating series on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This documentary hour focused upon Jewish-Arab relations within Green Line Israel (and not the territories).
The one possible flaw in this segment was that it highlighted extreme voices on both sides. Most of the angry and extreme statements came from Palestinian citizens of Israel, with Avigdor Lieberman supplying the fireworks from the pro-Jewish side.
Lieberman asserted that in 1974 (I don't know why he picked that year), most Israeli Arab villages flew the Israeli flag; now most Israeli Arabs are clearly alienated from the Jewish state. So what has happened?
Yavin's work looks at the demonstration/riot during the start of the second intifada in October, 2000, when 12 or 13 Arab citizens of Israel, who were demonstrating in solidarity with the intifada, were shot dead by police snipers. This was a shocking event for a democratic country, at least as disturbing as the killings of four American students at Kent State, in 1970, protesting the Vietnam War. And the Orr Commission recommendations were never implemented, and nobody from the police was ever indicted or prosecuted.
I see this as the final straw which followed hard upon the Israeli-Arab disappointment when their overwhelming support for Ehud Barak for prime minister in 1999 was neither recognized nor rewarded politically, perhaps with a place by an Arab party within Barak's governing coalition. Israeli Arabs had expected Barak to at least continue Rabin's enlightened policy, which had been to promote more equitable budget distributions to Arab communities and to accept Arab support from outside his minority coalition, to hold together a majority in the Knesset. By way of contrast, Barak actually empowered the most pro-settler party at the time, the National Religious Party, with seats in his cabinet and by continuing to expand settlements.
In the discussion that followed, Meretz USA (a co-sponsor of this event) had the honor of its vice president, Prof. Leonard Grob, moderate a discussion with historian Benny Morris and journalist Aharon Barnea. For my money, there is no better or more balanced chronicler of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict than Prof. Morris, but he disappoints when it comes to evaluating what's happening today.
He, as is Yavin in the film, is absolutely correct in observing that the Arabs' violent rejection of the UN partition plan of 1947, and their decision to go to war in an attempt to conquer the Jewish community, was the fundamental cause of the Nakba, the catastrophe that overwhelmed the Palestinian Arab people in 1948. Morris is a much better historian than Ilan Pappe, interviewed in Yavin's film, who totally blames the Jews for the events of 1948. But Morris has become a total pessimist and somewhat factually suspect in depicting recent events.
For example, he sees a majority of Palestinians, both within and outside Israel, as rejecting a two-state solution of living at peace with a majority Jewish state of Israel. Part of his evidence is the notion that "a majority" of Palestinian voters elected Hamas in the parliamentary elections of 2006. He completely rejects the very reasonable observation that many (and perhaps most) voters for Hamas at that time were rejecting the corruption and incompetence of the previously ruling Fatah party. To my mind, this vote did not mean that they were buying into the rejectionist, antisemitic and Islamist philosophy of Hamas. But this is what Morris sees and he even misreports the facts here, in that Hamas only won a plurality of 44% of the vote in 2006, even though it won a large majority of the seats because of Fatah candidates running against each other in some constituency districts.
Morris was also more even-handed than I think is justified in looking at how the Negev Bedouin people have been treated by the State of Israel and the Jewish National Fund. This issue was brought up in the Q & A by Gidon (Doni) Remba, head of the Jewish Alliance for Change. He blogs here on his disagreement with Morris.
The one possible flaw in this segment was that it highlighted extreme voices on both sides. Most of the angry and extreme statements came from Palestinian citizens of Israel, with Avigdor Lieberman supplying the fireworks from the pro-Jewish side.
Lieberman asserted that in 1974 (I don't know why he picked that year), most Israeli Arab villages flew the Israeli flag; now most Israeli Arabs are clearly alienated from the Jewish state. So what has happened?
Yavin's work looks at the demonstration/riot during the start of the second intifada in October, 2000, when 12 or 13 Arab citizens of Israel, who were demonstrating in solidarity with the intifada, were shot dead by police snipers. This was a shocking event for a democratic country, at least as disturbing as the killings of four American students at Kent State, in 1970, protesting the Vietnam War. And the Orr Commission recommendations were never implemented, and nobody from the police was ever indicted or prosecuted.
I see this as the final straw which followed hard upon the Israeli-Arab disappointment when their overwhelming support for Ehud Barak for prime minister in 1999 was neither recognized nor rewarded politically, perhaps with a place by an Arab party within Barak's governing coalition. Israeli Arabs had expected Barak to at least continue Rabin's enlightened policy, which had been to promote more equitable budget distributions to Arab communities and to accept Arab support from outside his minority coalition, to hold together a majority in the Knesset. By way of contrast, Barak actually empowered the most pro-settler party at the time, the National Religious Party, with seats in his cabinet and by continuing to expand settlements.
In the discussion that followed, Meretz USA (a co-sponsor of this event) had the honor of its vice president, Prof. Leonard Grob, moderate a discussion with historian Benny Morris and journalist Aharon Barnea. For my money, there is no better or more balanced chronicler of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict than Prof. Morris, but he disappoints when it comes to evaluating what's happening today.
He, as is Yavin in the film, is absolutely correct in observing that the Arabs' violent rejection of the UN partition plan of 1947, and their decision to go to war in an attempt to conquer the Jewish community, was the fundamental cause of the Nakba, the catastrophe that overwhelmed the Palestinian Arab people in 1948. Morris is a much better historian than Ilan Pappe, interviewed in Yavin's film, who totally blames the Jews for the events of 1948. But Morris has become a total pessimist and somewhat factually suspect in depicting recent events.
For example, he sees a majority of Palestinians, both within and outside Israel, as rejecting a two-state solution of living at peace with a majority Jewish state of Israel. Part of his evidence is the notion that "a majority" of Palestinian voters elected Hamas in the parliamentary elections of 2006. He completely rejects the very reasonable observation that many (and perhaps most) voters for Hamas at that time were rejecting the corruption and incompetence of the previously ruling Fatah party. To my mind, this vote did not mean that they were buying into the rejectionist, antisemitic and Islamist philosophy of Hamas. But this is what Morris sees and he even misreports the facts here, in that Hamas only won a plurality of 44% of the vote in 2006, even though it won a large majority of the seats because of Fatah candidates running against each other in some constituency districts.
Morris was also more even-handed than I think is justified in looking at how the Negev Bedouin people have been treated by the State of Israel and the Jewish National Fund. This issue was brought up in the Q & A by Gidon (Doni) Remba, head of the Jewish Alliance for Change. He blogs here on his disagreement with Morris.
Friday, November 12, 2010
Trying to Move a Mountain: NOLAGA Demonstrators Tactics and Message
Originally posted on Sarah's blog http://sarahstrnad.tumblr.com/ on Nov.12, 2010 and cross posted here.
For most of you the term General Assembly and its abbreviation GA probably denotes the UN’s main body, but for American Jews GA also refers to an additional and entirely different phenomenon. In the Jewish world the GA is the biggest annual meeting of North American Jews, American Jewish organizations and American Jewish leaders. It’s the big dance, the Super Bowl of American Jewish communal and political life. This year’s GA took place this past week in New Orleans and was dubbed NOLAGA, you may have seen twitter traffic with that hash-tag.So what Sarah? Why are you telling me this?
Well, something happened at NOLAGA on Monday, something that I don’t recall happening at past GAs, something that is making the rounds on the Internet. A group of young Jews who are associated with Jewish Voices for Peace (JVP) repeatedly interrupted Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s (Bibi’s) keynote address. You may have seen the video on YouTube, or on my blog. And if you haven’t see the video yet I suggest you check it out, the actions of the demonstrators as well as the reactions of Bibi and the crowd are telling.
This incident raises two separate issues for those of us on the left who refuse to exclude Israel from our overarching political paradigm and “be left on everything except Israel”: tactics and message.
The matter of tactics is neither small nor insignificant. For organizations, activists and social movements the tactics they employ, the mode of procedures used for gaining advantage or success, matters a great deal. If one’s tactics do not create an advantage or lead to success they are ineffective, if not counterproductive. I am of two minds when it comes to the tactics employed by the JVP activists at NOLGA. First and foremost, it is always important to speak truth to power, but this principle in and of itself is not a tactic, it is a philosophy for creating just change. When I first watched the Bibi’s speech live on the web I thought, “Good. Right on. That needs to be said. And the mainstream Jewish community needs to hear it.” That’s the rabble-rouser in me.
But on further reflection I’ve come to a second opinion (I am Jewish after all); that such an action was not an effective tactic. I don’t think it accomplished the presumed goal of getting the mainstream audience in attendance to question the normative narrative of Israel prevalent in the American Jewish community. I don’t think that interrupting a speech that an audience is predisposed to agree with is a good way to get that audience to hear your message. The protests not only didn’t change anyone’s mind but they elicited increasingly harsh, silencing, mob behavior and violence. Most of the people in the NOLAGA hall wanted to hear what Bibi had to say. Interrupting him went from an annoyance to a rallying cry to silence any criticism of his message. The tactic was counterproductive in that this specific choice of action made it less likely that the target audience would take the message seriously.
The message on the other hand was strong and clear. It is a message I not only agree with but also hope that more of the Jewish community will come to take seriously. “The loyalty oath delegitimizes Israel.” “The Occupation delegitimizes Israel.” “The settlements delegitimize Israel.” It is Israel’s actions, and not anti-Semitism, that damages Israel’s reputation and standing in the world at large. And it is those same actions that run counter to Jewish values and liberal and progressive politics that leads many Jews to question and criticize Israeli policies and actions. The loyalty oath flies in the face of being a true democracy while the Occupation and the settlements violate international law and human rights.
Yes, we all need to speak truth to power. We all need to say to our leaders both domestically and in Israel that the loyalty oath, Occupation, settlements, home demolitions, home expulsions and Separation Barrier do not represent our values or ideals. Those of us who disagree with those policies must not remain silent, but we also must remember who our audience is and play to them. We need to bring our analysis to them in a way they can interact with, digest, and ultimately embrace. Our message is one that reflects a largely silent majority in the American Jewish community and a significant portion of the Israeli Jewish citizenry; many of Israel’s policies relating to the Occupation are wrong, Israel should change those policies, and we have an obligation to help change those policies.
My favorite musician has a line in one of her songs; “I love my country/ by which I mean/ I am indebted joyfully/ to all the people throughout its history/ who have fought the government to make right/ where so many cunning sons and daughters/ our foremothers and forefathers/ came singing through slaughter/ came through hell and high water/ so that we could stand here/ and behold breathlessly the sight/ how a raging river of tears/ is cutting a grand canyon of light.” That’s the way I feel about both the US and Israel. We have the duty to fight the government to make right, but at the NOLAGA our fight was counterproductive, the message was not heard. We need to retain our message while crafting different tactics that will allow more people to hear it. The GA is the right venue, and we have the right message, now let’s figure out the right tactics. It is not just the message, which most definitely needs to be said, but also how that message is delivered that is important.
Utopian thinking on Iran
The Campaign for Peace and Democracy (CPD) describes itself as promoting "a new, progressive, and non-militaristic U.S. foreign policy." Its leadership can be characterized as part of the democratic left with what used to be known as a "third camp" orientation that was both anti-Stalinist and anti-capitalist.
The CPD is currently circulating a petition with a dual purpose: to "End the War Threats and Sanctions Program Against Iran [and] Support the Struggle for Democracy Inside Iran." So while supporting the democratic opposition inside Iran, it categorically opposes any punitive sanctions or military option to curtail Iran's nuclear program.
I share at least some of CPD's values and goals, but I cannot accept its doctrinaire pronouncements. Iran can easily end this confrontation by unconditionally opening itself to international inspections and stopping its outrageous provocations against Israel's existence. Moreover, Pres. Obama has made a reasonable diplomatic overture to Iran that was rejected last year.
The CPD's politics are marred with utopian thinking: asserting their highest ideals without any consideration of practical realities. It's not that they shouldn't proclaim their desire for a nuclear-free world, but how do they expect Israel or the US to disarm in the face of a country like Iran developing such weapons? And why do they also categorically oppose economic sanctions? As a matter of diplomatic strategy, leaving a hint of possible military action on the table, even though I'd hate to see it happen, may give the Iranians an added incentive to moderate and cooperate on this issue. (This posting overlaps with comments I wrote for Ameinu's website a couple of weeks ago.)
The CPD is currently circulating a petition with a dual purpose: to "End the War Threats and Sanctions Program Against Iran [and] Support the Struggle for Democracy Inside Iran." So while supporting the democratic opposition inside Iran, it categorically opposes any punitive sanctions or military option to curtail Iran's nuclear program.
I share at least some of CPD's values and goals, but I cannot accept its doctrinaire pronouncements. Iran can easily end this confrontation by unconditionally opening itself to international inspections and stopping its outrageous provocations against Israel's existence. Moreover, Pres. Obama has made a reasonable diplomatic overture to Iran that was rejected last year.
The CPD's politics are marred with utopian thinking: asserting their highest ideals without any consideration of practical realities. It's not that they shouldn't proclaim their desire for a nuclear-free world, but how do they expect Israel or the US to disarm in the face of a country like Iran developing such weapons? And why do they also categorically oppose economic sanctions? As a matter of diplomatic strategy, leaving a hint of possible military action on the table, even though I'd hate to see it happen, may give the Iranians an added incentive to moderate and cooperate on this issue. (This posting overlaps with comments I wrote for Ameinu's website a couple of weeks ago.)
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Am Yisrael Chai?
In the wake of the disruptions at the Federation General Assembly in New Orleans, I posted some thoughts at my blog. You can read them by clicking here.
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Debating BDS against Israel, in Brooklyn
A J Street colleague of mine is debating against the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign on the evening of Thurs., Nov. 11 (details to follow later in this post). I've indicated to him that if I were debating, there are at least two things that I'd be sure to mention:
1. That most (if not all) of the BDS leadership favors one state, meaning an end to Israel and opposition to the principle of self-determination for the Jewish people.
2. That both sides have committed wrongs in this conflict and that punishing Israel (i.e., Israelis as a people) assumes that only Israel is in the wrong.
Some who received my message responded that #2 was not appropriate to argue before an audience that's likely to be very critical of Israel. Nevertheless, my feeling is that the belief that Israel was born in sin, and that only Israel was and is guilty, is poisonous and needs to be refuted.
It's clear from history that if the Arab side had accepted the UN partition plan in Nov. 1947, and not attacked--first the Yishuv, beginning at the end of '47, and then sovereign Israel in May '48--there would have been no ongoing conflict and no refugee problem. We know this both from the early pioneering work of New Historian Benny Morris and others. Even Plan D or Dalet, cited by anti-Zionists as a smoking gun for expelling Palestinians, was formulated after the conflict began, and meant as a strategy to confront the onslaught which the Jews knew would come from outside Arab armies, at a time that they were still fighting a very hard battle against Palestinian irregulars (e.g., all of Jerusalem was besieged for months, mostly by Palestinian forces). And it was an attack on Jerusalem by Jordan that caused the West Bank to be conquered in the first place in 1967.
It is also true that both sides, but especially the Palestinians, can be admonished for misdeeds in recent times: launching the intifada instead of coming to an agreement in 2000 or 2001, and not capitalizing on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. There could have been progress or even an agreement in the wake of Sharon, Olmert and Livni splitting Likud and creating Kadima, a more moderate and peace-oriented party in the center. Instead, Hamas came to power--first legally with elections in Jan. 2006 and then in a coup in June 2007.
If not for the intifada, there would be no wall/barrier/fence in the West Bank. And Israel would have never attacked Gaza in 2008-09 if not for Hamas and attacks from that quarter on sovereign Israeli territory. So I'd argue that there's plenty of blame to go around.
These are the details on this week's debate in Brooklyn (by the way, the moderator is far from neutral; a co-editor of the resolutely anti-Zionist Mondoweiss website, he is likely to also be pro-BDS):
JEWISH PERSPECTIVES ON THE BOYCOTT/DIVESTMENT/SANCTIONS (BDS) MOVEMENT
Thursday, November 11, 2010 at 7:30 PM
1012 Eighth Avenue (between 10th St. & 11th St.), Park Slope,
Church of Gethsemane (F or G train to 7th Avenue)
The announcement continues as follows:
Many Jews wish to see Israel end the occupation; abide by international humanitarian law, human rights laws and precepts; and meet its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.
Some believe that an effective way to do so is to adopt and to maintain nonviolent and punitive measures through participating in a campaign to boycott, divest from, and sanction (BDS) Israel. The movement has grown rapidly since 2005, when a broad coalition of Palestinian civil society groups called on people around the world to join a movement that involves academic, cultural, consumer, and sports boycotts; encouragement of and pressure on individuals, financial institutions and companies to shed their investments in Israel; and sanctions—ending preferential trade, joint research, and other agreements, local and regional governments ties between municipalities or regional councils and Israel, and military links and support to Israel.
Others, whose goal is a two-state solution--where Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security—believe that this goal is ill- or ineffectively served by the global BDS movement and many of its allies, because they deploy BDS tools in ways that are more blunt than smart, the movement diverts resources from more effective advocacy and action, and BDS tends to alienate stakeholders from each other rather than encouraging their engagement and collaboration to achieve the goal.
We invite you to a respectful dialogue on BDS—whether you already have a position on it or you want to clarify for yourself the complex issues it raises. This event will provide an opportunity to hear from people who disagree about whether BDS is an appropriate and effective strategy. We are fortunate to have speakers who have thought deeply about--and been involved--in issues of peace and justice, who have spent a lot of time in Israel/Palestine, and who disagree with each other about BDS. We also have a moderator/respondent who will encourage the speakers and audience to probe more deeply into these issues. We hope you will join us.
Panelists:
Gil Kulick—co-chair of the J Street-NYC Communications/Media Committee; a founder of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom; former Communications Director of the New Israel Fund and deputy political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Israel and—will speak in opposition to the Global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement.
Hannah Mermelstein—active member, Adalah-NY: The New York Campaign for the Boycott of Israel; co-founder, Birthright Unplugged; co-founder, Students Boycott Apartheid—will speak in support of the Global BDS movement.
Kathleen Peratis—board member of J Street, The Forward, Human Rights Watch; former vice president New Israel Fund; former president NYCLU; occasional columnist for The Forward; partner New York law firm Outten & Golden LLP—will speak in opposition to the Global BDS movement.
Rebecca Vilkomerson—National Director of Jewish Voice for Peace; lived in Israel, 2006-2009; worked for a Palestinian-Israeli public policy center and a Bedouin-Jewish environmental rights organization—will speak in support of the Global BDS movement.
Moderator and respondent: Adam Horowitz— writer and co-editor of Mondoweiss, a news website devoted to covering American foreign policy in the Middle East, chiefly from a progressive Jewish perspective; co-editor of the upcoming book The Goldstone Report: The Legacy of the Landmark Investigation of the Gaza Conflict (Nation Books).
This event is co-sponsored by members of the Jewish community with different views on this issue: Naomi Allen, Anita Altman, Renate Bridenthal, Carol Horwitz, Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, Marilyn Neimark, Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Alisa Solomon, Meredith Tax, Ray Wofsy.
1. That most (if not all) of the BDS leadership favors one state, meaning an end to Israel and opposition to the principle of self-determination for the Jewish people.
2. That both sides have committed wrongs in this conflict and that punishing Israel (i.e., Israelis as a people) assumes that only Israel is in the wrong.
Some who received my message responded that #2 was not appropriate to argue before an audience that's likely to be very critical of Israel. Nevertheless, my feeling is that the belief that Israel was born in sin, and that only Israel was and is guilty, is poisonous and needs to be refuted.
It's clear from history that if the Arab side had accepted the UN partition plan in Nov. 1947, and not attacked--first the Yishuv, beginning at the end of '47, and then sovereign Israel in May '48--there would have been no ongoing conflict and no refugee problem. We know this both from the early pioneering work of New Historian Benny Morris and others. Even Plan D or Dalet, cited by anti-Zionists as a smoking gun for expelling Palestinians, was formulated after the conflict began, and meant as a strategy to confront the onslaught which the Jews knew would come from outside Arab armies, at a time that they were still fighting a very hard battle against Palestinian irregulars (e.g., all of Jerusalem was besieged for months, mostly by Palestinian forces). And it was an attack on Jerusalem by Jordan that caused the West Bank to be conquered in the first place in 1967.
It is also true that both sides, but especially the Palestinians, can be admonished for misdeeds in recent times: launching the intifada instead of coming to an agreement in 2000 or 2001, and not capitalizing on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. There could have been progress or even an agreement in the wake of Sharon, Olmert and Livni splitting Likud and creating Kadima, a more moderate and peace-oriented party in the center. Instead, Hamas came to power--first legally with elections in Jan. 2006 and then in a coup in June 2007.
If not for the intifada, there would be no wall/barrier/fence in the West Bank. And Israel would have never attacked Gaza in 2008-09 if not for Hamas and attacks from that quarter on sovereign Israeli territory. So I'd argue that there's plenty of blame to go around.
These are the details on this week's debate in Brooklyn (by the way, the moderator is far from neutral; a co-editor of the resolutely anti-Zionist Mondoweiss website, he is likely to also be pro-BDS):
JEWISH PERSPECTIVES ON THE BOYCOTT/DIVESTMENT/SANCTIONS (BDS) MOVEMENT
Thursday, November 11, 2010 at 7:30 PM
1012 Eighth Avenue (between 10th St. & 11th St.), Park Slope,
Church of Gethsemane (F or G train to 7th Avenue)
The announcement continues as follows:
Many Jews wish to see Israel end the occupation; abide by international humanitarian law, human rights laws and precepts; and meet its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.
Some believe that an effective way to do so is to adopt and to maintain nonviolent and punitive measures through participating in a campaign to boycott, divest from, and sanction (BDS) Israel. The movement has grown rapidly since 2005, when a broad coalition of Palestinian civil society groups called on people around the world to join a movement that involves academic, cultural, consumer, and sports boycotts; encouragement of and pressure on individuals, financial institutions and companies to shed their investments in Israel; and sanctions—ending preferential trade, joint research, and other agreements, local and regional governments ties between municipalities or regional councils and Israel, and military links and support to Israel.
Others, whose goal is a two-state solution--where Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security—believe that this goal is ill- or ineffectively served by the global BDS movement and many of its allies, because they deploy BDS tools in ways that are more blunt than smart, the movement diverts resources from more effective advocacy and action, and BDS tends to alienate stakeholders from each other rather than encouraging their engagement and collaboration to achieve the goal.
We invite you to a respectful dialogue on BDS—whether you already have a position on it or you want to clarify for yourself the complex issues it raises. This event will provide an opportunity to hear from people who disagree about whether BDS is an appropriate and effective strategy. We are fortunate to have speakers who have thought deeply about--and been involved--in issues of peace and justice, who have spent a lot of time in Israel/Palestine, and who disagree with each other about BDS. We also have a moderator/respondent who will encourage the speakers and audience to probe more deeply into these issues. We hope you will join us.
Panelists:
Gil Kulick—co-chair of the J Street-NYC Communications/Media Committee; a founder of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom; former Communications Director of the New Israel Fund and deputy political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Israel and—will speak in opposition to the Global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement.
Hannah Mermelstein—active member, Adalah-NY: The New York Campaign for the Boycott of Israel; co-founder, Birthright Unplugged; co-founder, Students Boycott Apartheid—will speak in support of the Global BDS movement.
Kathleen Peratis—board member of J Street, The Forward, Human Rights Watch; former vice president New Israel Fund; former president NYCLU; occasional columnist for The Forward; partner New York law firm Outten & Golden LLP—will speak in opposition to the Global BDS movement.
Rebecca Vilkomerson—National Director of Jewish Voice for Peace; lived in Israel, 2006-2009; worked for a Palestinian-Israeli public policy center and a Bedouin-Jewish environmental rights organization—will speak in support of the Global BDS movement.
Moderator and respondent: Adam Horowitz— writer and co-editor of Mondoweiss, a news website devoted to covering American foreign policy in the Middle East, chiefly from a progressive Jewish perspective; co-editor of the upcoming book The Goldstone Report: The Legacy of the Landmark Investigation of the Gaza Conflict (Nation Books).
This event is co-sponsored by members of the Jewish community with different views on this issue: Naomi Allen, Anita Altman, Renate Bridenthal, Carol Horwitz, Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, Marilyn Neimark, Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Alisa Solomon, Meredith Tax, Ray Wofsy.
Monday, November 08, 2010
On repairing Jewish-Arab relations in Israel
Lilly here. This is about what it means to be a Zionist. The following is excerpted from "2010-2020: A Decade of Repair," published in The Jerusalem Report by Shalom (Shuli) Dichter, the coexecutive director of Sikkuy, the Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality, from 1998 to 2008:
THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 2000 SHATTERED THE veneer of “co-existence” and laid bare the frustration, distrust and, especially, marginalization and alienation felt by the Arab- Palestinian citizens of Israel. ...
... Many Jews despaired. Nationalistic sentiments took center stage, fanned also by the brutality of the second intifada’s suicide bombers following the failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations at Camp David in the summer of 2000. Over the decade and especially over the last two years, we have been witness to an increase in racist discriminatory legislation against Arab citizens, although at least some of this legislation has been blocked by a few of our more reasonable politicians.
At the same time, we are also witness to developments that may prepare Israel for the next decade, the decade of repair (tikun): A Paradigm Shift: ... the Orr Commission, established to investigate the causes of and responses to the events of October 2000, presented a new paradigm. ...
Arab-Palestinian Initiative: In December 2006, a group of 38 Arab- Palestinian leaders and intellectuals, all citizens of Israel, published the Future Vision Papers, in which they outline a new framework for dialogue with the Jewish majority. The papers state clearly that Arab- Palestinians view themselves as a minority seeking group rights as an indigenous people and offer suggestions for ways to implement these rights. As a Zionist Jew, I read these papers with great resentment; yet I also know that the writers have laid down the foundation for a new form of dialogue and we must not reject their initiatives.
Knowledge and Expertise: Academic and advocacy organizations have developed knowledge and expertise that is finally making its way into the corridors of power. In the early 1990s, NGOs had to struggle even to prove that discrimination exists. Today, more and more government officials are attending conferences, responding to the uncomfortable findings and policy papers, and cooperating with the organizations and the academics to develop mechanisms for the implementation of equality-oriented policies.
Acknowledgment and Commitment: In June 2008, at the first Conference on Israeli Arab Issues organized by the Prime Minister’s Office, ... Ehud Olmert acknowledged that all past governments had wrongfully discriminated against Arab citizens and declared his commitment to righting this wrong. ... Olmert formed the Authority for Minority Economic Development, which is now the responsibility of Minister Avishai Braverman. On March 18, the Cabinet resolved to allocate 800 million shekels ($225 m.) over four years to 13 large Arab communities.... The resolution further instructs Braverman to prepare a ... multi-faceted policy of integration of Arab-Palestinian citizens, ... to be implemented over the following decade.
American Jewish Community: In July 2004, a group of Jewish leaders gathered in New York to discuss the role of American Jewry in helping to improve relations between Israel and its Arab-Palestinian citizens. The meeting led to the establishment, several months later, of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Arab Issues in Israel. Hosted by the Joint Distribution Committee, the Task Force now includes some 90 organizations in the US and the UK. ...
At the end of this decade, most Jews now understand that some 17 percent of Israel’s citizens identify as Arab Palestinians – and they are not leaving the country. ...
Over this same decade, Arab-Palestinian citizens have come to understand that the Jewish sense of collectivity will not evaporate or diminish and that the Arab Palestinians’ newly-adopted harsh style of discourse has made it difficult for Jews to embrace the concept of equal citizenship. Furthermore, Arab-Palestinian leaders realize that in order to benefit equally from the state’s resources, their municipal leadership must fundamentally improve local governance.
...Numerous issues must be solved over the next decade: housing, planning and lands; integration of the largely isolated Arab economy into the state’s economic life; radical yet sensitive solutions to the problems of the Bedouins in the Negev; systematic development of good local governance; social enhancement of Arab-Palestinian society; providing youth with the opportunity for higher education; and last – but certainly not least – elimination of all shapes and forms of racism against Arab Palestinians of Israel.
.... This is The Zionist challenge of the coming decade.
THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 2000 SHATTERED THE veneer of “co-existence” and laid bare the frustration, distrust and, especially, marginalization and alienation felt by the Arab- Palestinian citizens of Israel. ...
... Many Jews despaired. Nationalistic sentiments took center stage, fanned also by the brutality of the second intifada’s suicide bombers following the failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations at Camp David in the summer of 2000. Over the decade and especially over the last two years, we have been witness to an increase in racist discriminatory legislation against Arab citizens, although at least some of this legislation has been blocked by a few of our more reasonable politicians.
At the same time, we are also witness to developments that may prepare Israel for the next decade, the decade of repair (tikun): A Paradigm Shift: ... the Orr Commission, established to investigate the causes of and responses to the events of October 2000, presented a new paradigm. ...
Arab-Palestinian Initiative: In December 2006, a group of 38 Arab- Palestinian leaders and intellectuals, all citizens of Israel, published the Future Vision Papers, in which they outline a new framework for dialogue with the Jewish majority. The papers state clearly that Arab- Palestinians view themselves as a minority seeking group rights as an indigenous people and offer suggestions for ways to implement these rights. As a Zionist Jew, I read these papers with great resentment; yet I also know that the writers have laid down the foundation for a new form of dialogue and we must not reject their initiatives.
Knowledge and Expertise: Academic and advocacy organizations have developed knowledge and expertise that is finally making its way into the corridors of power. In the early 1990s, NGOs had to struggle even to prove that discrimination exists. Today, more and more government officials are attending conferences, responding to the uncomfortable findings and policy papers, and cooperating with the organizations and the academics to develop mechanisms for the implementation of equality-oriented policies.
Acknowledgment and Commitment: In June 2008, at the first Conference on Israeli Arab Issues organized by the Prime Minister’s Office, ... Ehud Olmert acknowledged that all past governments had wrongfully discriminated against Arab citizens and declared his commitment to righting this wrong. ... Olmert formed the Authority for Minority Economic Development, which is now the responsibility of Minister Avishai Braverman. On March 18, the Cabinet resolved to allocate 800 million shekels ($225 m.) over four years to 13 large Arab communities.... The resolution further instructs Braverman to prepare a ... multi-faceted policy of integration of Arab-Palestinian citizens, ... to be implemented over the following decade.
American Jewish Community: In July 2004, a group of Jewish leaders gathered in New York to discuss the role of American Jewry in helping to improve relations between Israel and its Arab-Palestinian citizens. The meeting led to the establishment, several months later, of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Arab Issues in Israel. Hosted by the Joint Distribution Committee, the Task Force now includes some 90 organizations in the US and the UK. ...
At the end of this decade, most Jews now understand that some 17 percent of Israel’s citizens identify as Arab Palestinians – and they are not leaving the country. ...
Over this same decade, Arab-Palestinian citizens have come to understand that the Jewish sense of collectivity will not evaporate or diminish and that the Arab Palestinians’ newly-adopted harsh style of discourse has made it difficult for Jews to embrace the concept of equal citizenship. Furthermore, Arab-Palestinian leaders realize that in order to benefit equally from the state’s resources, their municipal leadership must fundamentally improve local governance.
...Numerous issues must be solved over the next decade: housing, planning and lands; integration of the largely isolated Arab economy into the state’s economic life; radical yet sensitive solutions to the problems of the Bedouins in the Negev; systematic development of good local governance; social enhancement of Arab-Palestinian society; providing youth with the opportunity for higher education; and last – but certainly not least – elimination of all shapes and forms of racism against Arab Palestinians of Israel.
.... This is The Zionist challenge of the coming decade.
Friday, November 05, 2010
Midterms & MidEast: What's It Mean in USA?
The midterm elections brought a swift and stirring blow to the Democratic Party and to the President. This surprised no one, and it says a lot about where the American people are right now. The desperate economic situation has actually pushed American voters toward stronger candidates who advocate more radical positions rather than the moderates who, conventional wisdom tends to think, don’t alienate people and garner the “moderate middle” voters.
One of the lesser-reported facts of this election was the decimation of the “Blue Dog Democrats,” who lost half their number in the House. While it didn’t cut across the board in all elections, Americans certainly seemed to say they wanted to change the way politics are done in the US, and that they’re tired of middle-of-the-road leaders, indecisive in their choices. While this sort of thing has been a campaign slogan as far back as I can remember, I do not recall an election where it was reflected so strongly, especially on the heels of America electing a President largely on similar, albeit in Obama’s case, misplaced, sentiments.
So, what does all this have to do with Israel? More than one might think. When we couple it with some other crucial information about how Jews voted in this election, we can see the real room for change.
Jews, it turns out, stayed the Democratic course and, more importantly the massive attacks launched by ultra-right wing groups like the Emergency Committee for Israel had virtually no effect. With the exception of the Orthodox community, American Jews considered Israel a very low priority issue, completely dwarfed by the economy. And, as I read it, the polls also reflect a Jewish feeling in line with most liberals—that the problem is that the action taken on the economy, like on the Middle East, has not been decisive enough.
MJ Rosenberg contends that with Republican hawks in control of the House, things look better for peace. His idea is that “… it is Democrats, not Republicans who rush to the floor every time a possible peace initiative raises its head and shoots it down.” He’s right about that, but with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen about to assume the Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and Eric Cantor poised to be House Majority leader, there will be more than enough zealotry, political cache and political experience to make progress on the Israel-Palestine issue a very rough road indeed.
It’s true that Democrats torpedoed Obama’s efforts in the first two years of his presidency. A stronger president might be able to “heroically” confront Congress and the “hundreds of lobbyists” George H. W. Bush talked about, but, as I’ve said, it has become clear that Obama doesn’t have the will to do that.
Others have contended that the election was a major victory for Benjamin Netanyahu and his resistance to peace moves. Certainly, I’d agree that Bibi thinks this is the case. Indeed, Netanyahu has been maneuvering to put off any serious decision until after these elections, which, from the first, he knew would go against Obama because it would not be possible for the US to right the economic ship left in shambles by the Bush Administration.
But, really, what has Bibi gained? Under Ros-Lehtinen’s guidance, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will likely come up with some legislation at least as damaging to peace efforts as the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act she sponsored in 2006. But Howard Berman, Anthony Weiner, Gary Ackerman, Henry Waxman and other Congressional Democrats were able to push the President from within his own party to back off of pressure on Israel.
No, more likely the reality of this post-election playing field is that little has really changed regarding Israel, Obama and the near-term efforts at peace. Congress was an obstacle before and it will continue to be one. Obama could either take on the challenge or not and that also remains the case.
So why does this election matter?
The two messages – that people are craving bold political action in general and that elected officials who take a stand for peace are not going to be voted out – that were sent to the Democrats could resonate for a long time, if advocates for justice and peace keep them alive, particularly in mainstream discourse.
I’ll be hoping that President Obama proves me wrong and takes these messages as a spur to take on Congress and AIPAC and push hard for a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, a shared Jerusalem, a reasonable resolution to the issue of refugees—in short, one based on the eminently reasonable Arab Peace Initiative. But I’m not holding my breath on that one.
But this election shows that it is decisive action, not appeasement of the defenders of the status quo or the outright enemies of peace, is warranted and politically feasible. We have the tools we need to push not only Obama but also his successors in that direction. We have the political ammunition to combat those who would dishonestly claim that Americans, much less American Jews, want our government to back away from pressuring Israel on settlements and borders.
So, contrary to what one might think at first blush, now is the time to redouble our efforts. America is in a mood for change, so let’s offer a change in Middle East policy.
One of the lesser-reported facts of this election was the decimation of the “Blue Dog Democrats,” who lost half their number in the House. While it didn’t cut across the board in all elections, Americans certainly seemed to say they wanted to change the way politics are done in the US, and that they’re tired of middle-of-the-road leaders, indecisive in their choices. While this sort of thing has been a campaign slogan as far back as I can remember, I do not recall an election where it was reflected so strongly, especially on the heels of America electing a President largely on similar, albeit in Obama’s case, misplaced, sentiments.
So, what does all this have to do with Israel? More than one might think. When we couple it with some other crucial information about how Jews voted in this election, we can see the real room for change.
Jews, it turns out, stayed the Democratic course and, more importantly the massive attacks launched by ultra-right wing groups like the Emergency Committee for Israel had virtually no effect. With the exception of the Orthodox community, American Jews considered Israel a very low priority issue, completely dwarfed by the economy. And, as I read it, the polls also reflect a Jewish feeling in line with most liberals—that the problem is that the action taken on the economy, like on the Middle East, has not been decisive enough.
MJ Rosenberg contends that with Republican hawks in control of the House, things look better for peace. His idea is that “… it is Democrats, not Republicans who rush to the floor every time a possible peace initiative raises its head and shoots it down.” He’s right about that, but with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen about to assume the Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and Eric Cantor poised to be House Majority leader, there will be more than enough zealotry, political cache and political experience to make progress on the Israel-Palestine issue a very rough road indeed.
It’s true that Democrats torpedoed Obama’s efforts in the first two years of his presidency. A stronger president might be able to “heroically” confront Congress and the “hundreds of lobbyists” George H. W. Bush talked about, but, as I’ve said, it has become clear that Obama doesn’t have the will to do that.
Others have contended that the election was a major victory for Benjamin Netanyahu and his resistance to peace moves. Certainly, I’d agree that Bibi thinks this is the case. Indeed, Netanyahu has been maneuvering to put off any serious decision until after these elections, which, from the first, he knew would go against Obama because it would not be possible for the US to right the economic ship left in shambles by the Bush Administration.
But, really, what has Bibi gained? Under Ros-Lehtinen’s guidance, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will likely come up with some legislation at least as damaging to peace efforts as the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act she sponsored in 2006. But Howard Berman, Anthony Weiner, Gary Ackerman, Henry Waxman and other Congressional Democrats were able to push the President from within his own party to back off of pressure on Israel.
No, more likely the reality of this post-election playing field is that little has really changed regarding Israel, Obama and the near-term efforts at peace. Congress was an obstacle before and it will continue to be one. Obama could either take on the challenge or not and that also remains the case.
So why does this election matter?
The two messages – that people are craving bold political action in general and that elected officials who take a stand for peace are not going to be voted out – that were sent to the Democrats could resonate for a long time, if advocates for justice and peace keep them alive, particularly in mainstream discourse.
I’ll be hoping that President Obama proves me wrong and takes these messages as a spur to take on Congress and AIPAC and push hard for a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, a shared Jerusalem, a reasonable resolution to the issue of refugees—in short, one based on the eminently reasonable Arab Peace Initiative. But I’m not holding my breath on that one.
But this election shows that it is decisive action, not appeasement of the defenders of the status quo or the outright enemies of peace, is warranted and politically feasible. We have the tools we need to push not only Obama but also his successors in that direction. We have the political ammunition to combat those who would dishonestly claim that Americans, much less American Jews, want our government to back away from pressuring Israel on settlements and borders.
So, contrary to what one might think at first blush, now is the time to redouble our efforts. America is in a mood for change, so let’s offer a change in Middle East policy.
Wednesday, November 03, 2010
A way forward for peace talks?
UCLA political science professor Steven L. Spiegel has just outlined a possible way forward for the faltering Israeli-Palestinian peace talks by attempting to gain agreement on the settlement blocs to be annexed to Israel, where building may be resumed, and those outlying settlements where a freeze would be reimposed. I posted a similar idea in September. This is an abridged version of Spiegel's long piece in the Huffington Post:
The Obama administration's intense efforts to restart serious negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians have stalled once again, so far for the last month. U.S. attempts to achieve direct talks have stymied because of characteristic posturing: Once the Israelis agreed to a ten-month moratorium on construction in the West Bank, the Palestinians waited nine months to agree to direct talks, and then insisted they would not remain unless Israel extended the freeze, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has so far refused to do.
The Obama administration reacted by offering the Israelis a stunning package of American commitments, reportedly including that the US would not ask for another extension of the moratorium, that it would veto any UN Security Council initiative on Arab-Israeli peace during negotiations over the next year, that it would not object to leaving Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley for a prolonged period, and that it would provide additional security guarantees, including more fighter planes, missile defense and satellite access.
But so far the Israelis have refused to budge despite the surprising largesse from Washington so early in the talks. To all this, the Palestinian Authority has remained steadfast -- no return to negotiations until Israel resumes the moratorium. The Arab League gave Israel and the US a one-month deadline to gain a two-to-three month moratorium on construction in the settlements. Since then many Arab parties have proceeded to discuss openly going to the UN over the heads of Israel and the US to gain recognition of a Palestinian state.
.... While Israel would likely take the brunt of the blame from the international community for a breakdown in talks should it refuse the American guarantees, the Palestinians will also be faulted. It is they who wasted nine of the ten months of the Israeli freeze in diplomatic stalling, only to now insist on an extension of the moratorium. By doing so, the Palestinians have jeopardized prospects for negotiations aimed at creating their state in order to propound a principle of a settlement freeze that would be irrelevant should talks succeed.
Clearly it is in the interest of all three parties to resume direct talks with an Israeli extended moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank. Although the Middle East is famous for everyone putting ideology before rationality, let us assume that in this case the Israelis and Palestinians do indeed reach agreement on returning to direct talks under American auspices.... What then?
.... There has to be a product, a deliverable upon which to build. A concentration on borders is the logical place to start. The maneuvering by all three parties since the Obama administration began has made settlements the central issue. To move forward, this issue must be finessed or resolved indirectly.
There is precedent for this approach: the second phase of the roadmap, which called for a Palestinian state on provisional borders. But the Palestinians have always rejected that idea because they feared that if they had recognition of a Palestinian state within part of the territories Israel occupied in 1967, they'd never get anything else.
Obama and his team would have to overcome this Palestinian fear -- and Israeli reluctance under the current coalition government to withdraw from any territory -- by addressing the basics of the border question through concentrating on settlements. The goal would not be a complete accord on all details of a final deal on borders, but instead would have to be an agreement on the blocs that Israel will keep in a final settlement, where 80 percent of the settlers live and which are largely dispersed along the 1967 border. That will mean that Israelis can, [after a two month moratorium] beginning on the 61st day, build in those areas, but the moratorium elsewhere will have to continue, with an agreed commitment that the other settlers will have to leave according to a timetable to be determined. This would also be an opportunity to address reparations and incentives for those settlers who would be departing.
Skeptics will claim that a basic agreement in principle on which settlements are going to stay in Israel and which are going to be evacuated, is not possible in 60 days. Indeed, in theory it would be nice to tuck the settlements into a larger context of other issues as well. But the Obama administration's early insistence on a freeze, the Netanyahu coalition's initial refusal to extend the freeze longer than two months, and the Abbas position that he will only return to the talks with a renewed moratorium leaves the U.S. no choice. So why should and might the parties accept this idea?
For the U.S., the Obama administration cannot emerge from the 60-day talks without an agreement -- any agreement -- that will allow the talks to continue, and settlements are now the major impediment to that.
For the Palestinians, delineating the future of the settlements (those that will stay and those that will not) and agreeing on a 1-1 swap would mean agreeing on the basis of the Palestinian state. Much would be left, of course, including Jerusalem and refugees, the final delineation of borders, and Israel's security needs, but a major breakthrough would have been achieved. The alternative would be a complete breakdown and the loss of a chance at a Palestinian state in the near term, the strengthening of Hamas, and a probable Israeli construction spree after 60 days.
The Israelis are the most problematic here. Israel's gains in a 60-day deal are potentially enormous. They achieve U.S. and Palestinian acknowledgment that in any deal 80 percent of the settlers would remain where they are. They obtain American agreement for construction to continue unfettered and permanently in these areas. They would gain American agreement, already conferred but now official, that Israel would retain a presence on the Jordan Valley for security protection for an extended period.
But the Israeli right would finally have to give up its fantasy that it can retain the entire West Bank permanently. The 20 percent of settlers outside the settlement blocs would not be able to expand their settlements and would know they would have to leave, sooner rather than later. This will cause turmoil inside Israel, and would force the country to confront its most delicate political problem. The coalition may well collapse. Political careers would be at stake. This is a great deal to ask of any country, let alone Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has developed a reputation for being risk-averse.
.... The conflict cannot be solved in 60 days. With a great deal of luck and skill, the best the Obama administration can do is to get the settlement burden off everyone's back, and move on to addressing the rest of the key issues the two sides confront. Considering that the settlements are the ideological heart of Israel's right wing, that is no minor accomplishment. If in 60 days it is agreed which basic areas Israel will retain in the West Bank and which settlers will have to leave and the principle of a 1-1 swap is reached, there will be enough agreement to allow the talks to continue, with new momentum. That will be reason to celebrate, especially given the harsh alternatives to agreement and after the prolonged process that would have brought us to that point.
The Obama administration's intense efforts to restart serious negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians have stalled once again, so far for the last month. U.S. attempts to achieve direct talks have stymied because of characteristic posturing: Once the Israelis agreed to a ten-month moratorium on construction in the West Bank, the Palestinians waited nine months to agree to direct talks, and then insisted they would not remain unless Israel extended the freeze, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has so far refused to do.
The Obama administration reacted by offering the Israelis a stunning package of American commitments, reportedly including that the US would not ask for another extension of the moratorium, that it would veto any UN Security Council initiative on Arab-Israeli peace during negotiations over the next year, that it would not object to leaving Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley for a prolonged period, and that it would provide additional security guarantees, including more fighter planes, missile defense and satellite access.
But so far the Israelis have refused to budge despite the surprising largesse from Washington so early in the talks. To all this, the Palestinian Authority has remained steadfast -- no return to negotiations until Israel resumes the moratorium. The Arab League gave Israel and the US a one-month deadline to gain a two-to-three month moratorium on construction in the settlements. Since then many Arab parties have proceeded to discuss openly going to the UN over the heads of Israel and the US to gain recognition of a Palestinian state.
.... While Israel would likely take the brunt of the blame from the international community for a breakdown in talks should it refuse the American guarantees, the Palestinians will also be faulted. It is they who wasted nine of the ten months of the Israeli freeze in diplomatic stalling, only to now insist on an extension of the moratorium. By doing so, the Palestinians have jeopardized prospects for negotiations aimed at creating their state in order to propound a principle of a settlement freeze that would be irrelevant should talks succeed.
Clearly it is in the interest of all three parties to resume direct talks with an Israeli extended moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank. Although the Middle East is famous for everyone putting ideology before rationality, let us assume that in this case the Israelis and Palestinians do indeed reach agreement on returning to direct talks under American auspices.... What then?
.... There has to be a product, a deliverable upon which to build. A concentration on borders is the logical place to start. The maneuvering by all three parties since the Obama administration began has made settlements the central issue. To move forward, this issue must be finessed or resolved indirectly.
There is precedent for this approach: the second phase of the roadmap, which called for a Palestinian state on provisional borders. But the Palestinians have always rejected that idea because they feared that if they had recognition of a Palestinian state within part of the territories Israel occupied in 1967, they'd never get anything else.
Obama and his team would have to overcome this Palestinian fear -- and Israeli reluctance under the current coalition government to withdraw from any territory -- by addressing the basics of the border question through concentrating on settlements. The goal would not be a complete accord on all details of a final deal on borders, but instead would have to be an agreement on the blocs that Israel will keep in a final settlement, where 80 percent of the settlers live and which are largely dispersed along the 1967 border. That will mean that Israelis can, [after a two month moratorium] beginning on the 61st day, build in those areas, but the moratorium elsewhere will have to continue, with an agreed commitment that the other settlers will have to leave according to a timetable to be determined. This would also be an opportunity to address reparations and incentives for those settlers who would be departing.
Skeptics will claim that a basic agreement in principle on which settlements are going to stay in Israel and which are going to be evacuated, is not possible in 60 days. Indeed, in theory it would be nice to tuck the settlements into a larger context of other issues as well. But the Obama administration's early insistence on a freeze, the Netanyahu coalition's initial refusal to extend the freeze longer than two months, and the Abbas position that he will only return to the talks with a renewed moratorium leaves the U.S. no choice. So why should and might the parties accept this idea?
For the U.S., the Obama administration cannot emerge from the 60-day talks without an agreement -- any agreement -- that will allow the talks to continue, and settlements are now the major impediment to that.
For the Palestinians, delineating the future of the settlements (those that will stay and those that will not) and agreeing on a 1-1 swap would mean agreeing on the basis of the Palestinian state. Much would be left, of course, including Jerusalem and refugees, the final delineation of borders, and Israel's security needs, but a major breakthrough would have been achieved. The alternative would be a complete breakdown and the loss of a chance at a Palestinian state in the near term, the strengthening of Hamas, and a probable Israeli construction spree after 60 days.
The Israelis are the most problematic here. Israel's gains in a 60-day deal are potentially enormous. They achieve U.S. and Palestinian acknowledgment that in any deal 80 percent of the settlers would remain where they are. They obtain American agreement for construction to continue unfettered and permanently in these areas. They would gain American agreement, already conferred but now official, that Israel would retain a presence on the Jordan Valley for security protection for an extended period.
But the Israeli right would finally have to give up its fantasy that it can retain the entire West Bank permanently. The 20 percent of settlers outside the settlement blocs would not be able to expand their settlements and would know they would have to leave, sooner rather than later. This will cause turmoil inside Israel, and would force the country to confront its most delicate political problem. The coalition may well collapse. Political careers would be at stake. This is a great deal to ask of any country, let alone Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has developed a reputation for being risk-averse.
.... The conflict cannot be solved in 60 days. With a great deal of luck and skill, the best the Obama administration can do is to get the settlement burden off everyone's back, and move on to addressing the rest of the key issues the two sides confront. Considering that the settlements are the ideological heart of Israel's right wing, that is no minor accomplishment. If in 60 days it is agreed which basic areas Israel will retain in the West Bank and which settlers will have to leave and the principle of a 1-1 swap is reached, there will be enough agreement to allow the talks to continue, with new momentum. That will be reason to celebrate, especially given the harsh alternatives to agreement and after the prolonged process that would have brought us to that point.
Tuesday, November 02, 2010
Tea Party fizzles in Tel Aviv
According to a story in today's NY Times, a hard-right faction of the Likud attempted a "Tea Party" rally in Tel Aviv on Sunday, intending to stiffen Prime Minister Netanyahu's resolve to resist American efforts to persuade him to renew a freeze in settlement construction:
....Tea Partiers had gathered under the slogan: “Say No to Obama.”
They said they wanted to strengthen Mr. Netanyahu’s resolve to withstand the pressure. And there was an underlying threat of political consequences should he not.
But neither the meager display of red and black balloons, nor the handwritten signs on the walls saying no to the American president in Hebrew, English and Russian, nor even the refreshments, seemed to energize the crowd of a little over 100.
In Tel Aviv, famed as a city that never sleeps, the Tea Party inaugural event was over by 8:45 p.m., not two hours past its scheduled 7 p.m. start time, and most of the audience looked ready for bed. ...
Is Israel a 'Tea Party Nation'?
On the evening of Oct. 20, I attended a Manhattan forum organized by AlterNet, on the Tea Party---the populist but rabidly right-wing movement that has helped energize the Republican electoral wave set to sweep the nation today. The AlterNet writers who spoke (forgive me for having forgotten their names) had reasonable observations to make on the Tea Party; one of them has just edited a book on this subject.
Also participating was Max Blumenthal, a writer primarily for The Daily Beast and The Nation (and a fellow at The Nation Institute) and the author of "Republican Gomorrah: Inside The Movement That Shattered The Party." I first became aware of Blumenthal's existence at last year's J Street conference, where he participated in the unofficial bloggers' panel, which mostly sniped at J Street from the left (with the notable exception of Palestinian-American Chicagoan Ray Hanania who praised it).
Blumenthal's an articulate and acerbic speaker and is especially vitriolic regarding Israel, which he dubbed "the Tea Party Nation." This came up because he mentioned having just returned from Israel researching a new book, which is likely to be a vicious hatchet job. (Yet I did appreciate his quip that the Anti-Defamation League should be called "the Defamation League.")
I've read Time magazine's controversial Sept. 13th cover story, "Why Israel Doesn't Care About Peace" by Karl Vick, its Jerusalem bureau chief. Time's cover page headline was meant to be provocative and was probably not the writer's choice; the tamer title on the inside is "The Good Life And Its Dangers," followed by this summary: "Israelis feel prosperous, secure---and disengaged from the peace process. Is that wise?" Time's editors have chosen to frame the story in a way that can be read as hostile to Israelis.
But Vick makes the point that most Israelis are bitterly disappointed by the bloody intifada that followed the peace process of the 1990s: "....Yasser Arafat turned down a striking package of Israeli concessions at Camp David. What came next was the second intifadeh, a watershed of terror for an Israeli majority who, watching and suffering waves of suicide bombings, saw no reason to keep hope alive." The article indicates that most Israelis are resigned to the situation, and getting on with their lives while largely profiting from a vibrant economy. Unlike Blumenthal, Vick focuses on the mainstream, not its right-wing fanatics.
Last Thursday, Oct. 28, Meretz USA welcomed a favorite frequent guest, the former Meretz Member of Knesset, Avshalom (Abu) Vilan. Abu directly addressed this matter of Israeli attitudes. Like Vick, he sees a desire for peace and even a majority opposition to settlements, but he also observes a lack of trust in the intentions of the Palestinians. If there is a breakthrough in negotiations, he sees this cynicism as changing.
And he sees Netanyahu (whom he knew as a young man when both served in an army unit commanded by Ehud Barak), as having a hard time deciding whether he's willing to risk the necessary steps for peace. Netanyahu is weighing his options, partly because he doesn't want a breach with the Obama administration, and (according to Abu) because he would very much like the achievement of peace to be his legacy. At the same time, Abu sees Netanyahu as very much influenced by Barak, who as minister of defense is taking over most of the important functions of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman---the latter being unwelcome in most international diplomatic circles. Abu characterizes Barak as the most unpopular figure in Israeli politics, but sees Netanyahu as his last fan.
Abu is skeptical of the potential of the Kadima party, which he discounts as "Likud light." As for the left, he sees the need for a "broad front," and warns against the left-wing tendency to split the vote for new electoral lists. He does not see new elections in the near term, as he regards Netanyahu's coalition as stable.
Also participating was Max Blumenthal, a writer primarily for The Daily Beast and The Nation (and a fellow at The Nation Institute) and the author of "Republican Gomorrah: Inside The Movement That Shattered The Party." I first became aware of Blumenthal's existence at last year's J Street conference, where he participated in the unofficial bloggers' panel, which mostly sniped at J Street from the left (with the notable exception of Palestinian-American Chicagoan Ray Hanania who praised it).
Blumenthal's an articulate and acerbic speaker and is especially vitriolic regarding Israel, which he dubbed "the Tea Party Nation." This came up because he mentioned having just returned from Israel researching a new book, which is likely to be a vicious hatchet job. (Yet I did appreciate his quip that the Anti-Defamation League should be called "the Defamation League.")
I've read Time magazine's controversial Sept. 13th cover story, "Why Israel Doesn't Care About Peace" by Karl Vick, its Jerusalem bureau chief. Time's cover page headline was meant to be provocative and was probably not the writer's choice; the tamer title on the inside is "The Good Life And Its Dangers," followed by this summary: "Israelis feel prosperous, secure---and disengaged from the peace process. Is that wise?" Time's editors have chosen to frame the story in a way that can be read as hostile to Israelis.
But Vick makes the point that most Israelis are bitterly disappointed by the bloody intifada that followed the peace process of the 1990s: "....Yasser Arafat turned down a striking package of Israeli concessions at Camp David. What came next was the second intifadeh, a watershed of terror for an Israeli majority who, watching and suffering waves of suicide bombings, saw no reason to keep hope alive." The article indicates that most Israelis are resigned to the situation, and getting on with their lives while largely profiting from a vibrant economy. Unlike Blumenthal, Vick focuses on the mainstream, not its right-wing fanatics.
Last Thursday, Oct. 28, Meretz USA welcomed a favorite frequent guest, the former Meretz Member of Knesset, Avshalom (Abu) Vilan. Abu directly addressed this matter of Israeli attitudes. Like Vick, he sees a desire for peace and even a majority opposition to settlements, but he also observes a lack of trust in the intentions of the Palestinians. If there is a breakthrough in negotiations, he sees this cynicism as changing.
And he sees Netanyahu (whom he knew as a young man when both served in an army unit commanded by Ehud Barak), as having a hard time deciding whether he's willing to risk the necessary steps for peace. Netanyahu is weighing his options, partly because he doesn't want a breach with the Obama administration, and (according to Abu) because he would very much like the achievement of peace to be his legacy. At the same time, Abu sees Netanyahu as very much influenced by Barak, who as minister of defense is taking over most of the important functions of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman---the latter being unwelcome in most international diplomatic circles. Abu characterizes Barak as the most unpopular figure in Israeli politics, but sees Netanyahu as his last fan.
Abu is skeptical of the potential of the Kadima party, which he discounts as "Likud light." As for the left, he sees the need for a "broad front," and warns against the left-wing tendency to split the vote for new electoral lists. He does not see new elections in the near term, as he regards Netanyahu's coalition as stable.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)